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ABSTRACT 
While courts historically have taken a hands-off approach to 
settlement, judges across the legal spectrum have begun to intervene 
actively in “aggregate settlements”—repeated settlements between the 
same parties or institutions that resolve large groups of claims in a 
lockstep manner. In large-scale litigation, for example, courts have 
invented, without express authority, new “quasi-class action” doctrines to 
review the adequacy of massive settlements brokered by similar groups of 
attorneys. In recent and prominent agency settlements, including ones 
involving the SEC and EPA, courts have scrutinized the underlying merits 
to ensure settlements adequately reflect the interests of victims and the 
public at large. Even in criminal law, which has lagged behind other legal 
systems in acknowledging the primacy of negotiated outcomes, judges 
have taken additional steps to review iterant settlement decisions routinely 
made by criminal defense attorneys and prosecutors. 
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Increasingly, courts intervene in settlements out of a fear commonly 
associated with class action negotiations—that the “aggregate” nature of 
the settlement process undermines the courts’ ability to promote 
legitimacy, loyalty, accuracy and the development of substantive law. 
Unfortunately, when courts step in to review the substance of settlements 
on their own, they may frustrate the parties’ interests, upset the separation 
of powers, or stretch the limits of their ability. The phenomenon of 
aggregate settlement thus challenges the judiciary’s duty to preserve the 
integrity of the civil, administrative, and criminal justice systems.  
This Article maps the new and critical role that courts must play in 
policing aggregate settlements. We argue that judicial review should exist 
to alert and press other institutions—private associations of attorneys, 
government lawyers, and the coordinate branches of government—to 
reform bureaucratic approaches to settling cases. Such review would not 
mean interfering with the final outcome of any given settlement. Rather, 
judicial review would instead mean demanding more information about 
the parties’ competing interests in settlement, more participation by 
outside stakeholders, and more reasoned explanations for the trade-offs 
made by counsel on behalf of similarly situated parties. In so doing, courts 
can provide an important failsafe that helps protect the procedural, 
substantive, and rule-of-law values threatened by aggregate settlements. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Judges do more than “say what the law is.”1 They also preserve the 
integrity of our justice system by ensuring that it produces fair outcomes.
2
 
When it comes to settlement, however, judges have historically taken a 
more hands-off approach. Judges ordinarily will not set aside a privately 
reached settlement as long as it is a product of a contested and arm’s-
length negotiation.
3
  
Recently, however, some judges in civil, administrative, and even 
criminal law have begun to question the propriety of “aggregate 
settlements”—repeated settlements between the same parties or 
institutions that resolve large groups of claims in a lockstep manner. 
Consider the following examples: 
 Judge Alvin Hellerstein rejected a multi-million-dollar 
settlement to resolve over 10,000 Ground Zero workers’ claims, 
arguing: “Most settlements are private; a plaintiff and defendant 
come together, shake hands, and it’s done with . . . [B]asically 
 
 
 1. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (Marshall, C.J.). 
 2. See Ex parte Burr, 22 U.S. 529, 530 (1824) (Marshall, C.J.) (“[I]t is extremely desirable that 
the respectability of the bar should be maintained, and that its harmony with the bench should be 
preserved. For these objects, some controlling power, some discretion ought to reside in the Court.”). 
See also D. Brock Hornby, The Business of the U.S. District Courts, 10 GREEN BAG 2d 453, 463 
(2007) (describing the public’s reliance on judges to ensure “the integrity of the process”); RICHARD 
H. FALLON, JR. ET. AL., HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 72–
76 (6th ed. 2009) (discussing “dispute resolution” and “law declaration” models of the federal courts); 
Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and When, 82 YALE L.J. 1363, 1365–71 
(1973). 
 3. See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 
1285 (1976) (observing that traditionally “courts could be seen as an adjunct to private ordering, 
whose primary function was the resolution of disputes about the fair implications of individual 
interactions”). Lon Fuller is frequently associated with this traditional model of adjudication. See, e.g., 
LON L. FULLER, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, in THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL ORDER 86 
(Kenneth I. Winston ed., 1981); LON L. FULLER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 705–08 (temp. 
ed. 1949) [hereinafter FULLER, JURISPRUDENCE]. 
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it’s the parties that decide . . . This is different . . . This is a case 
that’s dominated my docket, and because of that, I have the 
power of review.” 4  
 In a series of opinions reviewing the SEC’s handling of more 
than 200 consent decrees, Judge Jed Rakoff rejected several 
proposed corporate settlements with the SEC.
5
 In one case, the 
Court said the deal showed a “cynical relationship between the 
parties: the S.E.C. gets to claim that it is exposing wrongdoing . . 
. [, while] the Bank’s management gets to claim that they have 
been coerced into an onerous settlement by overzealous 
regulators.”6  
 Judge William Young rejected several criminal plea deals, 
explaining that “however agreeable [the plea is] to the 
executive—once aggregated together with similar decisions 
across the criminal justice system—[it] results in the denigration 
of the criminal law.” 7 
At the time, all of these cases attracted attention for what were perceived 
as renegade acts of maverick judging.
8
 Each case represents, however, part 
of a broader, unexplored trend. Across the civil, administrative and 
criminal divide, courts have intervened out of a fear that the “aggregate” 
nature of the settlement process undermined the ability of our public 
dispute resolution system to promote legitimacy, loyalty, accuracy, and the 
 
 
 4. Transcript of Status Conference at 54, In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., No. 21 MC 
100 (AKH) (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2010).  
 5. S.E.C. v. Bank of Am. Corp., 653 F. Supp. 2d 507, 512 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (Rakoff, J.); S.E.C. 
v. Vitesse Semiconductor Corp., 771 F. Supp. 2d 304 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); S.E.C. v. Citigroup Global 
Mkts. Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328, 332 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 6. Bank of Am. Corp., 653 F. Supp. 2d at 512. 
 7. United States v. Orthofix, Inc., 956 F. Supp. 2d 316, 334 (D. Mass. 2013). 
 8. See, e.g., Howard M. Erichson, The Role of the Judge in Non-Class Settlements, 90 WASH. U. 
L. REV. 1015 (2013) (criticizing Judge Hellerstein’s decision); Jeremy T. Grabill, Judicial Review of 
Private Mass Tort Settlements, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 123, 182 (2012) (disagreeing with judicial 
decisions to reject private settlements); Robert Khuzami, Dir., Div. of Enf’t, U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Comm’n, Public Statement by SEC Staff: Court’s Refusal to Approve Settlement in 
Citigroup Case (Nov. 28, 2011), http://perma.cc/7464-QJSV (alleging that Judge Rakoff’s decision 
“ignores decades of established practice throughout federal agencies and decisions of the federal 
courts”); Gina L. Simms & John S. Linehan, The Judge Doth Reject: How to Prepare for Increased 
Judicial Scrutiny of Corporate Settlement Agreements in Health Care Cases, WHITE COLLAR CRIME 
COMM. NEWSLETTER (Am. Bar Ass’n, Criminal Justice Section, Chicago, IL), Winter 2013, at 3 
(noting that Judge Young’s decision was either an “aberration[]” or a “momentous shift” in judicial 
review of criminal plea bargains), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/ 
criminaljustice/simms_etal.authcheckdam.pdf.  
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development of substantive law. At the same time, judicial intervention 
into the substance of the settlement risked contravening the interests of the 
parties, upsetting the separation of powers, and stretching the limits of 
judicial competence.
 
 
An increase in judicial supervision of aggregate settlements would 
have wide-ranging repercussions across the law. Many informal 
procedures aggregate cases in civil, administrative, and criminal law. In 
personal injury, insurance, and multidistrict litigation, for example, the 
same plaintiff and defense lawyers rely on routine settlement practices in 
individual cases—sometimes negotiating sweeping settlement matrices to 
resolve thousands of claims brought by similarly situated victims.
9
 In 
criminal law, a categorical approach to plea bargains has led to high-
volume and cookie-cutter settlement systems, with little regard for 
criminal defendants’ culpability and individual circumstances.10 In multi-
million-dollar administrative settlements, federal agencies increasingly 
rely on centralized enforcement divisions, a small number of private claim 
facilities, and boilerplate settlements to set policy and provide 
compensation without traditional procedural safeguards to make rules or 
decide cases transparently.
11
 Even as we promise people the right to their 
 
 
 9. See Nora Freeman Engstrom, Sunlight and Settlement Mills, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 805, 809–11 
(2011); Howard M. Erichson, Informal Aggregation: Procedural and Ethical Implications of 
Coordination Among Counsel in Related Lawsuits, 50 DUKE L.J. 381, 386–401 (2000); H. LAURENCE 
ROSS, SETTLED OUT OF COURT: THE SOCIAL PROCESS OF INSURANCE CLAIMS ADJUSTMENT 22 (2d ed. 
1980) (finding that the system of insurance adjustment for automobile accidents “is individualistic 
mainly in theory; in practice it is categorical and mechanical, as any system must be if it is to handle 
masses of cases in an efficient manner”). 
 10. See Alexandra Natapoff, Aggregation and Urban Misdemeanors, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 
1043, 1071 (2013); Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons 
from Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 876–84 (2009); Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative 
System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2117 (1998). Cf. Albert W. Alschuler, The Failure 
of Sentencing Guidelines: A Plea for Less Aggregation, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 901, 908–09 (1991) 
(arguing aggregation in criminal sentencing has “led to the substitution of crime tariffs for the 
consideration of situational and offender characteristics in even simple and recurring cases” and 
emphasizes “harms, not people”); Malcolm M. Feeley & Jonathan Simon, The New Penology: 
Reformulating Penal Objectives and Implications for Penal Growth, in GROWTH AND ITS INFLUENCE 
ON CORRECTIONAL POLICY: PERSPECTIVES ON THE REPORT OF THE BLUE RIBBON COMMISSION (1990) 
(arguing that the “new penology” focusing on “the management of aggregate populations” has 
replaced an “old penology” that “focuse[d] on individuals”). 
 11. See, e.g., MICHAEL D. SANT’AMBROGIO & ADAM S. ZIMMERMAN, ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF 
THE UNITED STATES, DRAFT REPORT ON AGGREGATE AGENCY ADJUDICATION (Feb. 19, 2016), 
https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/aggregate-agency-adjudication-draft-report.pdf; 
Urska Velikonja, Public Compensation for Private Harm: Evidence from the SEC’s Fair Fund 
Distributions, 67 STAN. L. REV. 331 (2015) (describing use of centralized enforcement and 
management in SEC settlements).  
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own lawyer and their own “day in court,”12 outcomes in civil, criminal, 
and administrative disputes just as often turn on what happens in massive 
and opaque settlement bureaucracies—unseen organizations of lawyers, 
businesses and claim facilities—which quietly sweep together and resolve 
large groups of cases, swiftly and categorically.
13
 
In this Article, we set out to show what aggregated settlement means 
for our public system of adjudication and specifically for the obligations of 
the judges who shepherd cases through that system. Specifically, we think 
a legal system dependent on informally aggregated settlement presents 
challenges to judges across many areas of civil, criminal, and 
administrative law. All three systems, to varying degrees, rely on courts to 
resolve disputes in order to protect individual rights and promote the 
public interest. Settlements have long been a part of that process—
conserving public resources, while offering flexible alternative resolutions 
for the parties.
14
 But, in each system, courts have traditionally assumed 
that settlements resulted from contested, individualized, and arm’s-length 
negotiations requiring little judicial oversight of either the process or the 
result.
15
  
The reality of informal aggregate-settlement practice, however, upends 
the traditional view that settlements are simply creatures of contract that 
reflect parties’ individual choices made in the “shadow of the law.”16 
Settlements are instead mass produced by private bureaucratic systems, 
 
 
 12. Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892–93 (2008) (observing the “‘deep-rooted historic 
tradition that everyone should have his own day in court,’” (quoting Richards v. Jefferson Cty., 517 
U.S. 793, 798 (1996))); Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 51 (1987) (stating that the right to a day in 
court is a “necessary ingredient[]” of due process); Martin H. Redish & William J. Katt, Taylor v. 
Sturgell, Procedural Due Process, and the Day-in-Court Ideal: Resolving the Virtual Representation 
Dilemma, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1877, 1881 (2009) (“Our legal system employs a presumption that 
each person has a right to her day in court.”).  
 13. See Dana A. Remus & Adam S. Zimmerman, The Corporate Settlement Mill, 101 VA. L. 
REV. 129 (2015); Natapoff, supra note 10, at 1071; Samuel Issacharoff & John Fabian Witt, The 
Inevitability of Aggregate Settlement: An Institutional Account of American Tort Law, 57 VAND. L. 
REV. 1571, 1575 (2004). 
 14. See Judith Resnik, Diffusing Disputes: The Public in the Private of Arbitration, the Private in 
Courts, and the Erasure of Rights, 124 YALE L. J. 2804, 2844 (2015) (“Through a series of statutes and 
rule reforms, mediation and arbitration—methods characterized in the 1980s by both Chief Justice 
Burger and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as extrajudicial procedures—turned in the 1990s into 
everyday practices inside courts.”). 
 15. Chayes, supra note 3, at 1285; FULLER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 3. 
 16. See Robert Cooter et al., Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: A Testable Model of Strategic 
Behavior, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 225 (1982); Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the 
Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 968 (1979); Byron G. Stier, Jackpot 
Justice: Verdict Variability and the Mass Tort Class Action, 80 TEMP. L. REV. 1013, 1056–66 (2007) 
(describing benefits of multiple individual cases and jury verdicts for achieving accurate claim 
valuation in mass tort settlements).  
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resolving disputes according to categorical rules, local norms, and “going 
rates” divorced from the legal merits of the underlying claims.17  
 The attractions of aggregate settlement are manifold. Attorneys—who 
hold a legal monopoly over access to the courts—are naturally encouraged 
to broker ready-made deals based on their repeated interactions with the 
small coterie of judges, administrators, and decisionmakers who handle 
their clients’ disputes. Mass claim handling offers predictability in a world 
of open-ended legal standards, not to mention a survival mechanism to 
fight off crushing caseloads. Perhaps it should be little surprise that 
lawyers have relied on precursors to modern aggregate settlement practice 
since as long ago as the 1880s, when the American legal profession first 
came to maturity.
18
  
In all this time, however, we have continued to lack any satisfying 
theoretical foundation for judges to supervise aggregate settlement.
19
 The 
current judicial response to the rise of bureaucratic settlement has either 
been to passively accept such settlements as indistinguishable from 
individualized settlements or to intervene in an ad hoc fashion to try to 
assure “adequate” representation. In large-scale multidistrict litigation, for 
example, courts have created new “quasi-class action” doctrines to review 
the adequacy of massive settlements without express authority to do so.
20
 
 
 
 17. See Nora Freeman Engstrom, Run-of-the-Mill Justice, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1485, 1490 
(2009) (describing “going rates” for repeat personal injury claims where “settlement values are lumped 
together, largely decoupled from the substantive merit of the underlying claim”); Stephanos Bibas, 
Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2464, 2483 n.78 (2004) 
(“[B]argaining is tempered by stable going rates for ordinary crimes . . . .”). 
 18. See Issacharoff & Witt, supra note 13, at 1584–93; Lawrence M. Friedman, Civil Wrongs: 
Personal Injury Law in the Late 19th Century, 1987 AM. BAR FOUND. RES. J. 351, 372–73 (1987); 
MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES IN A LOWER CRIMINAL 
COURT (1979); MILTON HEUMANN, PLEA BARGAINING: THE EXPERIENCES OF PROSECUTORS, JUDGES, 
AND DEFENSE ATTORNEYS (1978). 
 19.  Judith Resnik, Judging Consent, 1987 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 43 (1987) (raising questions about 
the role of judicial review of non-aggregate across civil, administrative and criminal law). For one 
notable exception involving civil cases, see D. Theodore Rave & Andrew D. Brandt, The Information-
Forcing Role of the Judge in Multidistrict Litigation, 105 CAL. L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2017) 
(manuscript at 7) (arguing that federal judges may serve as information “intermediaries” in federal 
multidistrict litigation settlements), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2828461.  Professors Rave 
and Bradt’s forthcoming article is limited to complex civil litigation, but parallels arguments we 
advance abou that topic in Parts I.A.1 and II.A.1.  Their proscriptions go further, however, by asserting 
that judges can provide an important “signal” to parties about whether a settlement is good or bad 
based on a judge’s familiarity with the underlying litigation. Id. Our model, which we discuss in Part 
III, focuses instead on a judge’s ability to improve the parties’ incentives to exchange information and 
make reasoned trade-offs when they settle. 
 20. See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Judging Multidistrict Litigation, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 71 
(2015) (collecting cases and scholarship summarizing trend); Jack B. Weinstein, Ethical Dilemmas in 
Mass Tort Litigation, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 469, 529 (1994) (arguing mass consolidations “should be 
treated for some purposes as class actions”). 
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Similarly, in recent and prominent agency settlements, including ones 
involving the SEC and EPA, courts have scrutinized the underlying merits 
to ensure settlements adequately reflect the interests of victims and the 
public at large.
21
 Even criminal law, which has lagged behind other legal 
systems in acknowledging the primacy of settlement, has begun to require 
judges to review the adequacy of settlement decisions routinely made by 
criminal defense attorneys and prosecutors.
22
 It remains to be seen if the 
Supreme Court, which has been slow to acknowledge the critical role that 
plea-bargaining plays in the criminal process, will recognize the 
implications of aggregated pleas. 
While the passive acceptance of aggregate settlements might seem like 
an abdication of judicial responsibility, we ought to view this ad hoc 
judicial intervention with deep ambivalence. After all, courts themselves 
acknowledge that they lack the power, information, and expertise to ensure 
adequate representation at critical stages of the settlement process.
23
 And 
ensuring that attorneys remain loyal to their clients or to the public good 
provides little solace in a system where many predetermined features of 
the settlement exist beyond the control of any one attorney.  
The aggregation of individual settlement practices thus requires a 
rethinking of the role of judges in a world of bureaucratic settlement. We 
argue for a model of judicial review that plays a modest, but critical role in 
a world of mass settlement. Judicial review should exist to alert and press 
other institutions—private associations of attorneys, government lawyers, 
and the coordinate branches of government—to reform their institutional 
approach to settling cases. Such review would not mean interfering with 
the final outcome of any given settlement. Instead, judicial review would 
mean: (1) demanding more information about the parties’ competing 
interests in settlement, (2) more participation by outside stakeholders, and 
(3) more reasoned explanations for the trade-offs made by the counsel on 
 
 
 21. See Alison Frankel, Judge in SEC’s Bear Stearns case catches Rakoff fever, THOMPSON 
REUTERS NEWS & INSIGHT (Feb. 15, 2012), http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/2012/02/15/judge-
in-secs-bear-stearns-case-catches-rakoff-fever/; Bob Van Voris, SAC Judge Questions Record $602 
Million SEC Settlement, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 28, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-03-
28/sac-judge-questions-record-602-million-sec-settlement.html. 
 22. See Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012) (“The reality is that plea bargains have 
become so central to the administration of the criminal justice system that defense counsel have 
responsibilities in the plea bargain process, responsibilities that must be met to render the adequate 
assistance of counsel . . . .”); Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1384–88 (2012). 
 23. See, e.g., JACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS TORT LITIGATION 103 (1995) 
(“Yet we must bear in mind the need for humility on the part of the court. It often knows little about 
what goes on outside the courtroom. Its knowledge of the intricacies of the case is limited. Hubris is 
dangerous. Power tends to corrupt.”). See also infra Part II.B. 
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behalf of similarly situated parties. In so doing, courts can provide an 
important failsafe that helps protect the procedural, substantive, and rule-
of-law values threatened by recurring settlements.  
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I charts the rise of informal 
aggregate settlement practice across civil, criminal, and administrative 
law. Even though courts sometimes formally aggregate cases, like when 
one party represents and settles claims on behalf of many others in a class 
action, informally aggregated settlement practice is far more common in 
civil, criminal, and administrative law. In an “informal aggregation,” 
courts or parties group cases for settlement purposes by (1) centralizing 
individually represented parties with the same claims in front of the same 
judge or on the same courthouse docket or (2) using the offices of personal 
injury attorneys, corporate settlement facilities, or government divisions to 
organize and settle similar claims in bulk, mostly outside of any formal 
judicial process. 
After defining the concept of informal aggregation, Part I goes on to 
show that a legal system dependent on aggregated settlement challenges 
the judiciary’s obligation to preserve the integrity of the civil, 
administrative, and criminal justice processes. Aggregated settlement 
practice, however desirable or inevitable, raises new problems—
introducing new conflicts of interest, complicating parties’ meaningful 
participation, undermining accuracy, and reshaping legal rights in ways 
that frustrate the judiciary’s ability to “say what the law is.” In short, 
informal aggregation means that judges cannot rely on traditional 
adversarial decision-making to assure fair procedures, test the parties’ 
claims, promote just outcomes, or determine parties’ formal rights and 
responsibilities to each other.  
Part II shows how the lack of any satisfying theoretical foundation for 
judges to review recurring settlements in criminal, civil, and 
administrative law has created doctrinal disarray. The current judicial 
response to the rise of bureaucratic settlement has been to try to assure 
“adequate” representation for parties in criminal, civil, and administrative 
law. At the same time, courts acknowledge that they lack the information, 
expertise, and authority to ensure adequate representation at critical stages 
in an ongoing settlement process.  
Accordingly, Part III argues that judges may play a limited, but critical 
role in mass settlement practice. Judicial review of informally aggregated 
settlements should exist primarily to alert and press other institutions to 
reevaluate and reform institutional approaches to settling cases. We show 
that this form of judicial intervention recognizes that judges are in a 
unique position to identify—and to encourage parties to avoid—recurring 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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problems in repeat settlements. Our model of judicial review reflects the 
fact that courts do not only exist in a system of checks and balances 
designed to constrain action, but that our constitutional separation of 
powers forms a system of “prods and pleas”24 where distinct governmental 
branches and private institutions can push each other to improve the way 
they make decisions.  
Although some criticize
25
 and others praise
26
 judges who aggressively 
review repeat settlements, to date they have limited their attention to 
separate spheres of civil, administrative, and criminal law. As a result, 
they have overlooked what the challenge of aggregated settlement means 
for the judiciary itself. Our model of judicial behavior allows judges to 
promote fair outcomes in each system, while respecting the limits of their 
own abilities and the rights and privileges of the parties before them. 
I. THE INEVITABILITY OF AGGREGATE SETTLEMENT IN CIVIL, CRIMINAL, 
AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
Civil, criminal, and administrative proceedings begin with the “day in 
court” ideal. Plaintiffs in civil court receive personalized hearings to sort 
out private disputes with others.
27
 Judges frequently refuse to consolidate 
 
 
 24. See Benjamin Ewing & Douglas A. Kysar, Prods and Pleas: Limited Government in an Era 
of Unlimited Harm, 121 YALE. L.J. 350, 410 (2011) (“In the face of many twenty-first century harms, 
however, ‘pluralism’ requires not only multiple values, but also multiple institutions.”). 
 25. See Erichson, supra note 8, at 1024 (“When a judge purports to reject a settlement that would 
have been acceptable to the parties, the judge deprives the parties of control over their claims.”); Jean 
Eaglesham & Chad Bray, Citi Ruling Could Chill SEC, Street Legal Pacts, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 29, 
2011), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970203935604577066242448635560 (quoting 
Stanford University law professor Joseph Grundfest as saying, “Judge Rakoff’s decision will likely be 
troubling to the entire federal government, and not just the SEC.”). 
 26. See Tobias Barrington Wolff, Managerial Judging and Substantive Law, 90 WASH. U. L. 
REV. 1027 (2013) (arguing that substantive law empowered Judge Hellerstein to review substantive 
settlements); Samuel W. Buell, Liability and Admissions of Wrongdoing in Public Enforcement of 
Law, 82 U. CIN. L. REV. 505 (2013); John Cassidy, Why Judge Rakoff Was Right to Block the 
Citigroup Settlement, THE NEW YORKER (Nov. 29, 2011), http://perma.cc/86X8-WZUR; Brief of 
Amici Curiae Securities Law Scholars for Affirmance in Support of the District Court's Order and 
Against Appellant and Appellee at 17–23, S.E.C. v. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., 673 F.3d 158 (2d 
Cir. 2012) (No. 11-5227-cv), 2012 WL 7009633, at *17–23; Gordon Bourjaily, Note, DPA DOA: How 
and Why Congress Should Bar the Use of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements in Corporate 
Criminal Prosecutions, 52 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 543, 568 (2015) (observing that meaningful judicial 
review guards against overzealous prosecution and the risk of collusion). 
 27. See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 846 (1999); Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 762 
(1989) (observing it is “our ‘deep-rooted historic tradition that everyone should have his own day in 
court’” (quoting 18 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR MILLER, & EDWARD COOPER, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §4449, at 417 (1981))); JULES L. COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE: 
IN DEFENSE OF A PRAGMATIST APPROACH TO LEGAL THEORY 16 (2001) (“Tort law’s structural core is 
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criminal trials in order to protect each criminal defendant’s right to a fair 
trial and effective counsel.
28
 Agencies must provide citizens with a 
personal “kind of hearing”29 to challenge government acts that threaten 
their lives, property, or liberty.
30
 And while each system has come to 
recognize that most cases settle, we still tend to think of the outcome as 
part of an arm’s-length negotiation, brokered between two adversaries, 
conducted “in the shadow” of a legal process.31 
Each system, however, has long adopted exceptions that, in many 
respects, swallow the rule—grouping together and resolving large groups 
of similar claims, or what we call “aggregation.”32 Aggregation is a central 
feature of all legal systems. Policymakers and judges must design and 
interpret rules to treat like cases in a like manner.
33
 Legislators create 
agencies to adjudicate particular categories of cases.
34
 Federal and state 
criminal sentencing commissions set guidelines for punishing similar 
 
 
represented by case-by-case adjudication in which particular victims seek redress” from particular 
defendants, each of whom “must . . . make good her ‘own’ victim’s compensable losses.”).  
 28. See Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72, 79 (1959) (“[G]uilt by association remains a thoroughly 
discredited doctrine . . . .”); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 70 (1942) (holding that requiring an 
attorney to represent two codefendants in a conspiracy case whose interests were in conflict denied 
them the Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 
64 (1970) (“[T]he Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.”). 
See also Brandon L. Garrett, Aggregation in Criminal Law, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 386 (2007) (“The 
Supreme Court has held that the Constitution guarantees a fundamental right to an individual, not an 
aggregate, jury determination regarding each element of a crime necessary to prove guilt.”).  
 29. Henry J. Friendly, “Some Kind of Hearing”, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267 (1975); Goldberg v. 
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970) (requiring pre-termination hearing procedures for welfare benefit 
recipients).  
 30. 1 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7.02, at 412 (1958); Londoner 
v. City and Cnty. of Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908); Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 467 (1983) 
(observing that, in past decisions, people received “ample opportunity” to present evidence relating to 
their own claims and to show that an agency’s general “guidelines” for resolving common cases “do 
not apply to them”). 
 31. Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 16 (adopting individualized approach to settlement 
bargaining in divorce cases). But see Issacharoff & Witt, supra note 13; Adam F. Scales, Man, God 
and the Serbonian Bog: The Evolution of Accidental Death Insurance, 86 IOWA L. REV. 173 (2000); 
Stephen C. Yeazell, Re-Financing Civil Litigation, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 183 (2001); Robert G. Bone, 
Rethinking the “Day in Court” Ideal and Nonparty Preclusion, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 193 (1992). 
 32. Howard M. Erichson, A Typology of Aggregate Settlements, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1769, 
1784–95 (2005). 
 33. Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 139 (2005) (“Discretion is not whim, and 
limiting discretion according to legal standards helps promote the basic principle of justice that like 
cases should be decided alike.”); Alexandra D. Lahav, The Case for “Trial By Formula”, 90 TEX. L. 
REV. 571, 572 (2012) (“That like cases ought to be treated alike is a basic common law principle.”). 
 34. See, e.g., National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, §§ 2110–18, 
100 Stat. 3755, 3758-71 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-1 to -18 (2012)); Nora Freeman 
Engstrom, A Dose of Reality for Specialized Courts: Lessons from the VICP, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1631, 
1635 (2015). 
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forms of misconduct.
35
  Common law judges publish reasoned opinions 
and consider the precedential impact of their decisions on similar cases.
36
  
Legal systems also use other procedures to group together and settle 
large numbers of cases. In the United States, one a well-known kind of 
“aggregate lawsuit” is the class action—a single lawsuit that includes 
claims or defenses held by many different people. Other kinds of formal 
aggregations include derivative lawsuits, trustee actions, and state 
attorneys general parens patriae actions.
37
 In all such formal aggregations, 
a person, or a small group of people, may bind others to the outcome.  
But courts and parties routinely group together civil, administrative, 
and criminal claims in other ways.
38
 First, courts may “administratively 
aggregate” cases—channeling individually represented parties into the 
same courthouse, before the same judge, or onto a specialized docket. 
Second, parties may “privately aggregate” claims, largely outside of any 
formal judicial process, for settlement purposes. Each form of informal 
aggregation hopes to promote more efficiency, consistency, and, 
sometimes, a desired settlement outcome. We discuss these different forms 
of aggregation, which appear in Table 1 below, in Section A.  
 
 
 35. Alschuler, supra note 10, at 908–09 (arguing aggregation in criminal sentencing has led to 
“substitution of crime tariffs for the consideration of situational and offender characteristics in even 
simple and recurring cases. The focus has been on harms, not people”). 
 36. Issacharoff & Witt, supra note 13, at 1578 (“Common law tort doctrine has long adopted 
what we may call doctrines of substantive aggregation in tort.”).  
 37. See Margaret H. Lemos, Aggregate Litigation Goes Public: Representative Suits by State 
Attorneys General, 126 HARV. L. REV. 486 (2012). 
 38. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIG. § 1.02 (AM. LAW INST. 2010) 
[hereinafter ALI Principles] (describing informal aggregation); Erichson, supra note 9, at 386; Judith 
Resnik, Compared to What?: ALI Aggregation and the Shifting Contours of Due Process and of 
Lawyers’ Powers, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 628 (2011); Judith Resnik, From “Cases” to “Litigation”, 
54 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5 (1991) [hereinafter Resnik, From “Cases” to “Litigation”].  
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TABLE 1 
 
 Civil Law Administrative Law Criminal Law 
Formal 
Aggregation 
Class Action 
 
Parens Patriae 
Lawsuits 
Class Actions  
 
Agency Restitution 
Funds 
Habeas Class Actions  
 
Criminal Victim 
Compensation Funds 
 
Administrative 
Aggregation 
Multidistrict 
Litigation 
 
Patent Dockets and 
Intra-District 
Coordination  
 
Omnibus Proceedings 
 
Immigration “Surge 
Courts” 
Criminal “Problem 
Solving Courts” 
 
Domestic Violence 
Courts 
Private 
Aggregation 
High Volume 
Personal Injury 
Practices 
 
Corporate Settlement 
Mills 
 
Coordinated 
Settlement Offers 
  
“Industry-Wide” 
Settlements  
Standardized Pleas 
 
Boilerplate Waivers 
As we discuss in Section B below, aggregate settlements also create 
new risks and challenges. In individual settlement negotiations, a single 
lawyer ideally serves one client, responds to the client’s wishes in an 
arm’s-length transaction, and relies on past judicial decisions and trial 
outcomes to arrive at a fair deal. But, as we show, many civil, 
administrative, and criminal settlement negotiations are better viewed as 
aggregate bargains that resolve large portfolios of claims untethered from 
the merits of any one case. These aggregate settlements raise new concerns 
about what role judges should play in resolving aggregate disputes in a 
legitimate, meaningful, and accurate way.  
A. Aggregation in Civil, Administrative and Criminal Law 
Although commonly associated with complex litigation, different 
forms of procedural aggregation exist across civil, administrative, and 
criminal law. This section describes the use of aggregation in each area of 
law, before describing what they mean for judicial power. 
1. Aggregate Settlements in Civil Law 
Policymakers and courts have long embraced civil settlements. The 
general assumption is that one-on-one lawsuits, which make up the “bulk” 
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of civil filings in federal and state courts, are usually very easy to 
resolve.
39
 The litigation system relies on each side to develop its own case 
and control its own lawyers. Judges only get involved when lawyers fail to 
live up to their duty to faithfully represent the interests of their clients in 
settlement negotiations, or when there is a concern that the resolution of 
the case will impact other parties or interests not represented in the 
immediate dispute. The limited role of judges in individual civil 
settlements reflects the idea that private dispute resolution will produce 
superior outcomes when negotiations are conducted outside the courtroom, 
at arm’s-length and taking into account the facts of the individual case.  
The most well-known exception to this rule is the class action, where 
judges review settlements precisely because publicly approved counsel 
who represent large groups of people, and may be tempted to reach 
sweetheart deals, make class-wide determinations.
40
 Judicial review thus 
exists to ensure class counsel faithfully represent absent class members, to 
provide a forum to hear from dissenting interest groups, and to ensure that 
the final settlement adequately reflects the underlying merits and the 
public interest. Thus, even as they promise greater efficiency, consistency 
and legal access, class action lawsuits struggle to (1) promote loyalty when 
attorneys serve disparate interests; (2) ensure legitimacy when clients lack 
input and control over the outcome; and (3) achieve accuracy when ready-
made settlements blur characteristics of many different kinds of cases or 
overlook their individual merits.  
In addition to class actions, rules in civil litigation have, for a long 
time, also allowed parties to collectively bring large numbers of similar 
cases in informal ways, including: (1) administrative aggregation; (2) 
private aggregation; and (3) passive aggregation. Like class actions, 
informal aggregation also invites judges to “manage” mass settlements 
more actively than they would individual “cases and controversies.” This 
is because informal aggregations and class actions have long raised similar 
concerns.  
Administrative aggregation captures those times where many different 
parties retain separate counsel, but are assigned to the same judicial forum 
because the claims raise common questions of law or fact. In civil 
litigation, the most well-known form of administrative aggregation is 
 
 
 39. See ALI Principles, supra note 38, § 1.05 cmt. b. 
 40. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e) advisory committee’s note to 2003 amendment (“Settlement may be a 
desirable means of resolving a class action. But court review and approval are essential to assure 
adequate representation of class members who have not participated in shaping the settlement.”). 
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multidistrict litigation,
41
 where a panel of judges may assign a large 
number of similar claims filed around the country to the same judge to 
streamline discovery, manage motion practice, coordinate counsel and, in 
many cases, expedite settlement.
42
 Since its creation in 1968, the Judicial 
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation has centralized almost half a million civil 
actions for pretrial proceedings.
43
 Other forms of administrative 
aggregation in civil law include specialized dockets—like those designed 
to expedite patent claims filed in the Eastern Districts of Virginia and 
Texas
44—or inter-district rules designed to ensure that a single judge hears 
all “related claims” in the same district.45  
But administratively aggregated civil cases may also frustrate loyal 
representation and accurate outcomes. First, lawyers experience conflicts 
when they settle individual cases in administrative aggregations, 
particularly because the success of any one settlement often depends on 
the same lawyer settling hundreds of similar claims.
46
 One example 
involved the settlement of the national Vioxx litigation. In Vioxx, the 
settlement globally resolved the litigation after plaintiffs’ attorneys and 
Merck agreed that each participating attorney recommend the settlement to 
100% of her eligible clients (and, more controversially, to withdraw from 
representing any client who refused).
47
 If fewer than 85% of claimants 
consented, Merck could rescind its offer entirely. Such “walk-away 
clauses” can exert enormous pressure on counsel, requiring lawyers 
 
 
 41. See Emery G. Lee III et al., Multidistrict Centralization: An Empirical Examination, 12 J. 
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 211, 222 (2015). 
 42. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2012). See also Andrew Bradt, A Radical Proposal: The Multidistrict 
Litigation Act of 1968, 165 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (on file with authors).  
 43. Lee et al., supra note 41, at 211. By the end of 2013, 13,432 actions had been remanded for 
trial, 398 had been reassigned within the transferee districts, 359,548 had been terminated in the 
transferee courts, and 89,123 were pending throughout the district courts. Judicial Panel on 
Multidistrict Litigation – Judicial Business 2013, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/judicial-panel-multidistrict-litigation-judicial-business-2013. 
 44. See J. Jonas Anderson, Court Competition for Patent Cases, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 631 (2015); 
Daniel Klerman & Greg Reilly, Forum Selling, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 241 (2016).  
 45. See, e.g., S.D.N.Y. & E.D.N.Y. LOCAL R. 13 (amended Jan. 1, 2014); Richard G. Kopf, A 
cheap shot, HERCULES AND THE UMPIRE (Nov. 3, 2013), http://herculesandtheumpire.com/2013/11/03/ 
a-cheap-shot/ (“The reason we have relatedness rules in the district courts is to avoid treating similar 
cases dissimilarly and because it wastes judicial resources by duplicating effort when two judges deal 
with similar issues.”). 
 46. See ALI Principles, supra note 38, § 3.16 cmts. a–c; Erichson, supra note 32, at 1784 
(characterizing such conflicts as problems of claim “conditionality”). 
 47. Settlement Agreement at § 1.2.8.1–2, In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1657 (E.D. 
La. Nov. 9, 2007), http://www.officialvioxxsettlement.com/documents/Master%20Settlement%20 
Agreement%20-%20new.pdf. See also Howard M. Erichson & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Consent Versus 
Closure, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 265, 279–92 (2011).  
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
560 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 94:545 
 
 
 
 
simultaneously to take into account the interests of the individual and the 
larger group before advising how to settle any one case.
48
 
Second, administratively aggregated civil cases complicate legitimacy 
because they rarely lead to tailored negotiated bargains that reflect 
individual control. Most instead inevitably lead to private bureaucracies 
established by a small number of lawyers, special masters, or magistrates, 
designed to efficiently determine payouts. In the multidistrict litigation 
involving September 11 recovery workers, to this day, parties continue to 
work out settlements according to a matrix established using a 
sophisticated database that sorted among different categories of diseases, 
exposures, and ages.
49
  
Third, administrative aggregation complicates accuracy—particularly 
when settlements do not reflect one-on-one bargaining, but instead are 
resolved categorically by the same plaintiff and defense counsel, with 
weak incentives to learn about the underlying merits. This is sometimes a 
result of perverse incentives created by the ways parties must organize 
themselves to process large volumes of claims. For example, plaintiffs and 
defendants complain that multidistrict litigation favors volume over 
knowledge: attorneys often receive coveted and lucrative positions on 
steering committees based on the sheer number of clients they retain in the 
litigation.
50
 Those incentives may, in turn, delay and discourage lawyers 
from investing limited resources to develop the facts of individual cases 
before reaching a global settlement.
51
  
Counsel may also frustrate accuracy by “bundling” different cases in 
order to settle them in the same way.
52
 Settlements in multidistrict 
litigation often lead to “damage averaging,” where parties informally agree 
to settle a mix of strong and weak cases for more or less than they would 
 
 
 48. Erichson, supra note 32, at 1796–97 (observing that such walk-away deals “pit[] the lawyer’s 
self-interest, as well as the interest of other clients, against the interest of a client who does not wish to 
accept the settlement”). 
 49. See In re World Trade Ctr. Lower Manhattan Disaster Site Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 477, 479–80 
(S.D.N.Y. 2015). 
 50. RICHARD A. NAGAREDA, MASS TORTS IN A WORLD OF SETTLEMENT 231, 260 (2007). 
 51. Jaime Dodge, Facilitative Judging: Organizational Design in Mass-Multidistrict Litigation, 
64 EMORY L.J. 329, 351 (2014) (observing that, in multidistrict litigation, “the financial incentive [for 
lawyers] is to invest as little as possible in the individual case, as any time invested will not impact 
their ultimate payout—as only time spent on developing generic assets, and not individual cases, is 
compensable as common-benefit work”). 
 52. For one example, see, e.g., In re Guidant Corp. Implantable Defibrillators Prods. Liab. Litig., 
MDL No. 05–1708 (DWF/AJB), 2008 WL 682174, at *10 (D. Minn. Mar. 7, 2008) (justifying the 
amount of the common benefit award by noting that “Plaintiffs’ counsel achieved a global settlement 
of $240,000,000.00 for 8,550 Plaintiffs” and “that many of the individual cases likely are not strong 
stand-alone cases”). See also Burch, supra note 20, at 80–82 (discussing Guidant). 
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ordinarily be worth if the cases were settled separately.
53
 As a result, 
settlements in multidistrict litigation sometimes mean that a single case 
may not be resolved according to its individual merit, but, more often, 
according to categorical rules of thumb, established norms, and 
predetermined outcomes. 
“Private aggregations” raise some of the same problems associated 
with other forms of civil aggregation. In private aggregation, parties 
resolve large groups of cases in the same way without relying on judges or 
courts to centralize them. One example is personal injury “settlement 
mills”—high volume settlement practices, where a single law firm bundles 
large numbers of claims, otherwise worth too little to represent separately, 
to settle with insurance adjusters, claim facilities, or other defendants. Jim 
Rogers, known by his infamous ads in the San Francisco Bay Area as 
“The People’s Lawyer,” handled as many as 1,500 open automobile cases 
at any given time, with settlement values ranging between $1,000 and 
$9,000.
54
 Settlement mill bargains are remarkable because they are 
typically struck based on “going rates,” without first-hand information 
about verdicts obtained in comparable cases or the intricacies of any 
particular claim.
55
 
Similarly, corporate defendants frequently use private aggregation to 
create “corporate settlement mills” to resolve large numbers of similar 
claims.
56
 Private aggregation systems, created by defendants, plaintiffs, 
and sometimes large intermediaries to resolve large numbers of claims 
outside of court, have existed for over a century.57 But corporate 
settlement mills can impose costs of their own. Defendants who settle 
repeat cases in obscurity invite abuse, offer inconsistent payouts, and may 
undermine the public regulatory goal of deterring future bad behavior.
58
 
 
 
 53. See Howard M. Erichson, Beyond the Class Action: Lawyer Loyalty and Client Autonomy in 
Non-class Collective Representation, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 519, 551–52 (2003) (some parties “may 
worry that collective representation will have a damage-averaging effect, raising the value of weak 
claims and reducing the value of strong ones.”.); ALI Principles, supra note 38, § 3.16 cmt. c. 
 54. Erin Hallissy, ‘People’s Lawyer Accused: State Bar Says He Charges Too Much, S.F. GATE 
(Jan. 11, 1997), http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/PAGE-ONE-People-s-Lawyer-Accused-State-
Bar-2858914.php (”Rogers said he has about 1,500 cases, more than most other attorneys handle.”); 
Engstrom, supra note 8, at 821. 
 55. See, e.g., Engstrom, supra note 17, at 1534 (“Instead of an individualized and fact-intensive 
analysis of each case’s strengths and weaknesses alongside a careful study of case law and comparable 
jury verdicts, settlement mill negotiators and insurance claims adjusters assign values to claims with 
little regard to fault based on agreed-upon formulas, keyed off lost work, type and length of treatment, 
property damage, and/or medical bills, which in turn relate to the severity of the injury.”). 
 56. See Remus & Zimmerman, supra note 13, at 136–48. 
 57. See Friedman, supra note 18, at 372–73; Issacharoff & Witt, supra note 13, at 1584–93. 
 58. Remus & Zimmerman, supra note 13, at 158 (observing that such settlement systems, 
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Claimants also may unwittingly waive valuable rights because the 
defendants, as “repeat players” in the system, enjoy inherently superior 
bargaining positions. Owens Corning, in the late 1990s, leveraged its 
market share to persuade over 215,000 asbestos plaintiffs, who could 
receive nothing if Owens Corning went bankrupt, to waive their rights to 
sue and participate in its private National Settlement Program.
59
 
In addition to deliberate forms of aggregation, aggregation can occur in 
more subtle ways where no court or party consciously groups cases 
together, but where norms, boilerplate language, and “going rate” values 
for different personal injuries dictate the outcome.
60
 In complex civil 
litigation, the same plaintiff and defense lawyers often serve on “steering 
committees” collaborating and sharing information about related cases—
carrying certain biases about how to structure discovery, handle complex 
scientific questions, allocate fees, and approach settlement negotiations 
based on their past experiences with one another. Those attorneys may 
avoid raising dissenting views about how to approach litigation out of a 
not-altogether-misplaced fear that their objections may impact their ability 
to serve on another steering committee.
61
 Organizational norms may 
similarly lead insurance adjusters and claim handlers to streamline 
completely unrelated personal injury and automobile accident cases 
according to the same standard operating procedure.
62
   
 
 
“created at the encouragement or requirement of the law, frequently exploit the compromised positions 
of travelers stranded at a gate, shrimpers grounded by an oil spill, or homeowners facing foreclosure”).  
 59. NAGAREDA, supra note 50, at 109–11 (describing Owens Corning’s efforts to “accumulate a 
sufficiently large chunk of the remaining liability in the asbestos litigation” to “induce” plaintiffs to 
participate in its National Settlement Program); Remus & Zimmerman, supra note 13, at 141–42, 158.  
 60. Engstrom, supra note 17, at 1490 (describing “going rates” for repeat personal injury claims 
where “settlement values are lumped together, largely decoupled from the substantive merit of the 
underlying claim”); Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, It Was the Best of Times, It Was the Worst of 
Times: The Precarious Nature of Plaintiffs’ Practice in Texas, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1781, 1796, 1804 
(2002); HERBERT M. KRITZER, LET’S MAKE A DEAL: UNDERSTANDING THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS IN 
ORDINARY LITIGATION 39, 71 (1991). 
 61. Charles Silver & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Quasi-Class Action Method of Managing Multi-
District Litigations: Problems and a Proposal, 63 VAND. L. REV. 105, 151 (2010) (“Clientless lawyers 
depend entirely on judges' largesse. Beholden more to judges than to plaintiffs, they can be expected to 
prefer the former over the latter when interests collide.”); Burch, supra note 20, at 86 (“[C]ooperation 
fosters a need for attorneys to curry favor with one another, which, when combined with the 
prevalence of repeat players, can infect leadership committees with well-documented group decision-
making biases, like conformity.”). 
 62. ROSS, supra note 9, at 22 (finding that the system of insurance adjustment for automobile 
accidents “is individualistic mainly in theory; in practice it is categorical and mechanical, as any 
system must be if it is to handle masses of cases in an efficient manner”). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss3/5
  
 
 
 
 
2017] JUDGING AGGREGATE SETTLEMENT 563 
 
 
 
 
2. Aggregate Settlements in Administrative Law 
In administrative law, agency enforcement actions already carry the 
efficiencies of aggregate litigation by organizing special interests to 
enforce laws passed by Congress. Agencies, for example, often seek 
restitution, injunctive relief, and other remedies on behalf of large groups 
of stakeholders.
63
 Agencies also resolve large groups of claims through 
formal consolidations, statistical sampling, and even class actions.
64
 But 
far more often, agencies informally aggregate cases administratively, 
privately, and passively.  
First, some agencies employ forms of administrative aggregation that 
resemble multidistrict litigation in federal court. The Executive Office of 
Immigration Review—which hears all cases involving detained aliens, 
criminal aliens, and aliens seeking asylum—offers one example of 
administrative aggregation. In the past year, it has designated special 
“surge courts” to respond to over 2,000 Central American asylum cases 
pending in West Texas.
65
 In the National Vaccine Injury Compensation 
Program, over 5,000 separate cases alleging that a particular vaccine 
caused autism may proceed in front of the same special master in what is 
known as an “Omnibus Proceeding.”66 Such cases raise some of the same 
potential problems as other administrative aggregations—producing 
settlements brokered by repeat counsel, sometimes categorically, without 
detailed inquiry into the individual merits of each case.  
 
 
 63. See Velikonja, supra note 11, at 339; Verity Winship, Fair Funds and the SEC’s 
Compensation of Injured Investors, 60 FLA. L. REV. 1103, 1134–41 (2008); Adam S. Zimmerman, 
Distributing Justice, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 500, 527–39 (2011).  
 64. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, for example, created an administrative 
class action procedure, modeled after Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to resolve 
“pattern and practice” claims of discrimination made by federal employees. See also 29 C.F.R. § 
1614.204 (2016) (establishing class complaint procedures); 42 C.F.R. § 431.222 (2016) (providing 
“group hearings” for Medicaid-related claims); 45 C.F.R. § 205.10(a)(5)(iv) (2016) (providing “group 
hearings” to applicants who request a hearing because financial assistance was denied). See generally 
Michael D. Sant’Ambrogio & Adam S. Zimmerman, Inside the Agency Class Action, 126 YALE. L.J. 
1634 (2017). 
 65. See, e.g., Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, EOIR Announces Change to Immigration Judges 
Hearing Cases Out of Dilley (Apr. 14, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/pr/eoir-announces-change-
immigration-judges-hearing-cases-out-dilley (announcing that the Executive Office for Immigration 
Review assigned over 2,000 cases in Dilley, Texas to the Miami Immigration Court to conduct 
hearings by teleconference); Wil S. Hylton, The Shame of America’s Family Detention Camps, N.Y. 
TIMES MAG. (Feb. 4, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/08/magazine/the-shame-of-americas-
family-detention-camps.html.  
 66. Snyder ex rel. Snyder v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 01–162V, 2009 WL 
332044, at *4 (Fed. Cl. Feb. 12, 2009) (describing history of omnibus proceedings involving 
allegations by 5,000 claimants that vaccines caused autism); Sant’Ambrogio & Zimmerman, supra 
note 64. 
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Second, administrative settlements may also be organized and 
consolidated by the agency itself, mostly outside of judicial control. 
Medicare and the EPA have entered what some call “industry-wide” 
settlements,
67
 brokering deals as part of a systemic response to an ongoing 
policy or problem. For example, facing an estimated backlog of over 
800,000 billing disputes with medical providers, hospitals, and doctors, in 
October 2014 Medicare offered to resolve hundreds of thousands of billing 
disputes by globally offering to pay hospitals with pending claims 68% of 
their net value.
68
 By June 2015, Medicare executed serial settlements with 
more than 1,900 hospitals, representing approximately 300,000 claims, for 
over $1.3 billion.
69
 Of course, in such cases, individually represented 
parties have almost no room to bargain; they rather must accept or reject 
offers that may have little to do with the different merits of each case.  
Industry-wide settlements also risk shutting out the public, by creating 
obscure obligations divorced from substantive law. In 2005, for example, 
the EPA offered qualified animal feeding operations (AFOs)—over 2,500 
agribusinesses that produce pork, dairy, turkey and eggs across the 
country— a global settlement to resolve their liability under the Clean Air 
Act.
70
 Much like a private aggregation, each individual AFO would enter 
into separate, but otherwise identical, agreements with the EPA. Each 
AFO would agree to pay a civil fine (categorically based only on the size 
of the AFO) to fund a nationwide study on monitoring AFO emissions 
and, if requested, help the EPA to monitor emissions from the AFO. In 
return, the EPA agreed not to sue the participating AFOs for past and 
ongoing violations while the study was undertaken. The settlement was 
viewed favorably by industry, as well as the EPA, which had long claimed 
that it lacked a precise methodology for calculating the amount of 
pollutants emitted by AFOs. But citizens who lived downstream from the 
AFOs complained that they too deserved a chance to comment on what 
 
 
 67. See Ass’n of Irritated Residents v. E.P.A., 494 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Daniel T. 
Deacon, Deregulation Through Nonenforcement, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 795, 813–16 (2010) (describing 
industry-wide settlements). 
 68. Press Release, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Inpatient Hospital Reviews (last 
checked Oct. 6, 2016) [hereinafter Inpatient Hospital Reviews], https://www.cms.gov/Research-
Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Monitoring-Programs/Medicare-FFS-Compliance-Programs/Medical-
Review/InpatientHospitalReviews.html; Reed Abelson, Medicare Will Settle Short-Term Care Bills, 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 29, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/30/business/medicare-will-settle-
appeals-of-short-term-care-bills.html. 
 69. Inpatient Hospital Reviews, supra note 68. 
 70. See Animal Feeding Operations Consent Agreement and Final Order, 70 Fed. Reg. 40,016, 
40,017 (July 12, 2005).  
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seemed to be, in effect, an entirely new regime for taxing and regulating 
major farming operations.
 71
  
Even when agencies adopt procedural safeguards to individually 
evaluate claims, they may be subject to “group think” or other norms when 
they resolve similar cases.
72
 For example, according to former SEC 
General Counsel and Chairman, Harvey Pitt, the SEC follows “exacting 
standards” before filing and settling its enforcement actions.73 The 
Enforcement Division utilizes a “tiered review” structure—several layers 
of review are performed before the Division reaches any final 
determination, including “detailed written memoranda, indicating their 
conclusions, describing evidence supporting those conclusions, [and] 
identifying and addressing ‘exculpatory’ evidence.”74 Notwithstanding the 
SEC’s well-intended effort to consider the individual facts of each 
enforcement action, many continue to raise concerns about the SEC’s 
practice of settling enforcement actions alleging serious fraud without 
admitting facts, on the basis of pro forma “obey the law” injunctions, and 
disproportionately small financial penalties.
75
 For example, only after a 
federal district judge pointed out the contradiction of allowing defendants 
in an SEC enforcement action to settle charges without admitting or 
denying the allegations after they had previously pleaded guilty in parallel 
criminal proceedings, did the SEC’s Division of Enforcement change its 
policy to eliminate the “neither admit nor deny” option in all such cases.76  
 
 
 71. See Ass’n of Irritated Residents, 494 F.3d at 1030–31 (noting and rejecting plaintiffs’ 
arguments).  
 72. CASS R. SUNSTEIN & REID HASTIE, WISER: GETTING BEYOND GROUPTHINK TO MAKE 
GROUPS SMARTER (2015); Cass R. Sunstein, The Most Knowledgeable Branch, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 
(forthcoming) (manuscript at 15) [hereinafter Sunstein, The Most Knowledgeable Branch], 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2630726 (“If an agency is acting on its own, there 
might well be reason to worry about myopia, mission orientation, and tunnel vision, potentially 
compromising the ultimate judgment.”). 
 73. Brief of Amicus Curiae Former Securities and Exchange Commission General Counsel and 
Chairman, Harvey Pitt in Support of Affirmance of District Court’s Ruling at 9, S.E.C. v. Citigroup 
Glob. Mkts. Inc., 673 F.3d 158 (2d Cir. 2012) (No. 11-5227-cv), 2012 WL 7009635, at *9.  
 74. Id. at 10 (citing SEC DIV. OF ENF’T OFFICE OF CHIEF COUNSEL, ENFORCEMENT MANUAL 
62–73 (Mar. 9, 2012)). 
 75. See, e.g., Samuel W. Buell, Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Civil Liability, in 
PROSECUTORS IN THE BOARDROOM: USING CRIMINAL LAW TO REGULATE CORPORATE CONDUCT 87 
(Anthony S. Barkow & Rachel E. Barkow eds., 2011). 
 76. Robert Khuzami, Dir., Div. of Enf’t, U.S. Securities and Exchange Comm’n, Public 
Statement by SEC Staff: Recent Policy Change (Jan. 7, 2012), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2012/ 
spch010712rsk.htm.  
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3. Aggregate Settlements in Criminal Law 
At first blush, criminal law would appear to be the last bastion of 
individualized justice. Each defendant is guaranteed a “day in court” and 
an attorney who is loyal only to the defendant’s cause.77 The plea 
bargaining process is generally characterized as an arm’s-length 
negotiation between two adversaries.
78
 Indeed, legal ethics demand that 
defense attorneys vigorously advocate on behalf of their individual clients 
without regard to the needs or interests of any other party.
79
 Closer 
inspection, however, reveals that the criminal process also relies on 
informal aggregation, which shapes criminal bargains in ways that raise 
the same issues of loyalty, legitimacy, and accuracy as civil and 
administrative settlements.  
Unlike civil litigation, the criminal justice system rarely tolerates 
formal aggregation, like class actions.
80
 The Supreme Court has sharply 
limited class actions of habeas petitions—an area that once provided a 
source of criminal justice reform.
81
 On occasion, however, courts have 
aggregated shared claims, such as those concerning falsified crime lab 
evidence,
82
 ineffective assistance of counsel claims based on an 
inadequately funded public defender program,
83
 and allegations of racial 
disparities in death penalty sentencing.
84
 Finally, prosecutors may 
 
 
 77. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948) (“A person’s . . .right to his day in court [is] basic in 
our system of jurisprudence; and these rights include, as a minimum, a right to examine the witnesses 
against him, to offer testimony, and to be represented by counsel.”). 
 78. But see Natapoff, supra note 10; FEELEY, supra note 18. 
 79. Margareth Etienne, The Ethics of Cause Lawyering: An Empirical Examination of Criminal 
Defense Lawyers As Cause Lawyers, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1195, 1236 (2005) (“Lawyers 
scrupulously observing their ethical duty to represent each client zealously would never advise a client 
to join [a] collective action unless the client would clearly be one of the beneficiaries.”). 
 80. See Garrett, supra note 28, at 385 (describing the increased use of aggregation to provide 
“system-wide relief in criminal cases”). Since the 1990s, the Supreme Court has limited the occasions 
where criminal defendants may pursue class-wide relief. Id. at 404–10 (tracing the rise and fall of 
habeas corpus class actions, observing that they “illuminate[] what the criminal system would look like 
if there was a role for aggregation to permit vindication of patterns of constitutional violations”).  
 81. State v. Reynolds, 836 A.2d 224, 374 (Conn. 2003). But see Calderon v. Ashmus, 523 U.S. 
740, 748 (1998) (rejecting class action of habeas petitioners when the district court did not first 
determine whether all class members properly exhausted their individual claims in state courts). 
 82. See In re Investigation of the W. Va. State Police Crime Lab., Serology Div., 438 S.E.2d 501 
(W. Va. 1993); see also Garrett, supra note 28, at 386. 
 83. See State v. Peart, 621 So. 2d 780, 784 (La. 1993) (describing how the trial court held a series 
of hearings on the defense services being provided to criminal defendants in Section E of Criminal 
District Court before finding that “the system of securing and compensating qualified counsel for 
indigents” in Louisiana was “unconstitutional as applied in the City of New Orleans”). 
 84. See Garrett, supra note 28, at 419–21 (describing the aggregation of death penalty cases 
asserting racial disparities in sentencing); see also In re Proportionality Review Project, 735 A.2d 528, 
532–33 (N.J. 1999); Reynolds, 836 A.2d at 376–86. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss3/5
  
 
 
 
 
2017] JUDGING AGGREGATE SETTLEMENT 567 
 
 
 
 
indirectly aggregate claims for victim restitution—pursuing actions against 
corporate criminals, collecting their ill-gotten gains, and distributing 
restitution to groups of victims who never directly participate in the 
lawsuit.
85
  
But while formal aggregations remain relatively rare, the criminal 
justice system commonly uses administrative aggregation.
86
 Sometimes 
government officials group together large numbers of similar cases in the 
same courthouse or docket in response to temporary “surges” in policing, 
like those following the 2004 Republican National Convention in New 
York or attempts to “sweep” away homeless populations.87 But criminal 
courts also routinely group together cases that share a common attribute in 
specialized courts—from traditional traffic courts88 to more modern court 
innovations like “problem solving” drug, mental health, and veterans’ 
courts.
89
 These aggregated cases are subject to a particularized settlement 
environment—court personnel trained to deal with certain social issues, 
prosecutors who specialize in a specific type of crime or defendant, and 
court resources that support particular kinds of dispositions. While some 
praise specialized courts for adopting a “[t]ailored [a]pproach to 
[j]ustice,”90 they inevitably produce machine-made settlements much like 
the rest of the criminal justice system. For example, prosecutors routinely 
offer standardized “alternative sentencing options” in domestic violence 
 
 
 85. Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecution, 93 VA. L. REV. 853 (2007); Adam S. 
Zimmerman & David M. Jaros, The Criminal Class Action, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1385 (2011).  
 86. See David Jaros, Flawed Coalitions and the Politics of Crime, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1473, 1505 
(2014) (describing the rise of specialized “problem-solving courts”); Betsy Tsai, The Trend Toward 
Specialized Domestic Violence Courts: Improvements on an Effective Innovation, 68 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1285 (2000). 
 87. See Caleb Foote, Vagrancy-Type Law and Its Administration, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 603, 632 
(1956). 
 88. In California state courts, traffic filings, including both misdemeanors and infractions, 
consistently hovered around the six-million filing mark from 2004 through 2013, the last year for 
which figures are available. See JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, 2014 COURT STATISTICS REPORT: 
STATEWIDE CASELOAD TRENDS 2003-2004 THROUGH 2012-2013 75 (2014), http://www.courts.ca. 
gov/documents/2014-Court-Statistics-Report.pdf; Ross D. Netherton, Fair Trial in Traffic Court, 41 
MINN. L. REV. 577, 581 (1957) (“[P]eople are coming to these courts by millions each year as 
defendants or as witnesses in traffic matters—20 million as defendants in 1951—in comparison with 
the relatively small number who experience justice from the courts of last resort in the state house.”) 
(citations omitted). This figure, roughly six times the number of non-traffic misdemeanors and 
infractions, has recently forced state courts to scramble to search for new ways to automate and 
privatize the case handling of most traffic violations. 
 89. See John S. Goldkamp, Justice and Treatment Innovation: The Drug Court Movement 1 
(First Nat’l Drug Court Conference, Working Paper No. 149260, 1993).  
 90. GREG BERMAN & JOHN FEINBLATT WITH SARAH GLAZER, GOOD COURTS: THE CASE FOR 
PROBLEM-SOLVING JUSTICE 4–5 (2005). 
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court based upon established relationships with private service providers 
who offer prepackaged anger management or conflict resolution classes.
91
  
Formal office policies governing the treatment of particular kinds of 
criminal cases also mirror the private aggregation observed in civil 
litigation. Just as single firms bundle cases together and resolve them 
according to a unified settlement strategy,
92
 so too do prosecutors adopt 
policies that govern the treatment of large categories of cases. In 2002, the 
District Attorneys of all five boroughs of New York City adopted a city-
wide plea bargaining policy under a program entitled “Operation 
Spotlight” that targeted “persistent misdemeanants.”93 Pursuant to the 
policy, the assistant district attorneys refused to offer a reduced plea at 
arraignment and, instead, recommended a plea to the top charge and the 
maximum statutorily allowed sentence.
94
 Regardless as to whether the 
defendant was arrested for shoplifting cheese
95
 or misdemeanor assault,
96
 
prosecutors categorically demanded the maximum one-year sentence for 
both crimes.
97
  
Like their state counterparts, federal prosecutors also adopt categorical 
policies that dictate settlement practice for large groups of cases. In the 
Western District of Texas, federal prosecutors have standardized their plea 
agreements to include boilerplate language requiring every defendant, 
regardless of the nature of the crime or the circumstances of the charges, to 
waive any and all constitutional claims that might arise from a failure of 
the prosecution to satisfy their obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence 
to the defense.
98
  
 
 
 91. ATLANTA MUNICIPAL CT., OFFICE OF CT. PROGRAMS, http://court.atlantaga.gov/ 
courtprograms (last visited Oct. 6, 2016) (describing Municipal Court of Atlanta’s Community Court 
“partnerships with county, state, private and non-profit agencies which provide treatment services to 
the Court’s defendants”). 
 92. See Remus & Zimmerman, supra note 13. 
 93. A “persistent misdemeanant” was defined as a defendant with an adult criminal record with 
two or more prosecuted arrests in the previous year, at least one of which must have had a top arrest 
charge of misdemeanor severity. “In addition, the defendant must previously have been convicted of 
misdemeanor crimes at least twice, and at least one of these convictions must have been within twelve 
months of the current arrest.” FREDA F. SOLOMON, N.Y.C. CRIMINAL JUSTICE AGENCY, OPERATION 
SPOTLIGHT: YEAR FOUR PROGRAM REPORT (2007), http://www.nycja.org/library.php. 
 94. Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Managerial Justice and Mass Misdemeanors, 66 STAN. L. REV. 611, 
660–61 (2014) (describing the New York City district attorney’s plea bargaining policy under 
Operation Spotlight).  
 95. See id. (discussing a defendant accused of stealing cheese who was subject to Operation 
Spotlight); see also N.Y. PENAL LAW § 155.25 (McKinney 2004) (petit larceny). 
 96. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.00 (McKinney 2004). 
 97. See Kohler-Haussmann, supra note 94, at 660 (noting that the defendant accused of stealing 
cheese would have been offered a plea carrying one year of jail time under Operation Spotlight). 
 98. See Susan R. Klein et al., Waiving the Criminal Justice System: An Empirical and 
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To a significant extent, prosecutors’ ability to privately aggregate their 
cases exploits a collective action problem among defendants.
99
 While 
prosecutors routinely adopt categorical settlement policies, public 
defenders’ duty to vigorously advocate for their individual clients limits 
their ability to act collectively.
100
 There have been instances, however, 
when public defender offices have, in fact, treated individual cases as a 
group—either in an attempt to improve outcomes for defendants as a 
whole or as a response to budget constraints. In Los Angeles, public 
defenders adopted a blanket policy to refuse all guilty pleas in prostitution 
cases as part of a successful effort to persuade judges to adopt a more 
lenient sentencing policy for those cases.
101
 Defenders burdened by 
overwhelming caseloads have been forced to “group advise” the pleas for 
up to fifteen clients at a time, in the courthouse hallways, with little or no 
opportunity to explore the specific facts surrounding each defendant’s 
individual charge.
102
  
Private aggregation in the criminal system also jeopardizes accuracy, 
loyalty, and legitimacy. Plea policies will often fail to account for the 
idiosyncrasies of individual cases. By treating cases collectively, public 
defenders reduced the average sentence in Los Angeles for prostitution 
cases in the future, but only at the expense of ignoring their duty of loyalty 
to their existing individual clients.
103
 Finally, when public defenders 
collectively advise clients to take pleas in response to crushing caseloads, 
 
 
Constitutional Analysis, 52 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 73, 83 (2015) (highlighting the boilerplate agreement 
offered by the government in Plea Agreement, United States v. Botello, No. 13-051, ¶ 2 (W.D. Tex., 
Apr. 3, 2013)). 
 99. See Oren Bar-Gill & Omri Ben-Shahar, The Prisoners’ (Plea Bargain) Dilemma, 1 J. LEGAL 
ANALYSIS 737 (2009) (describing the ability of prosecutors to overcome their budget constraints by 
exploiting defendants’ collective action problem). 
 100. Id. at 761 (“The public defender’s office can solve the collective action problem that plagues 
its clients only if each public defender forgoes her duty of loyalty to the individual client.”); see also 
Albert W. Alschuler, The Defense Attorney’s Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE L.J. 1179, 1252 
(1975) (explaining how collective action by public defenders can “pose a serious ethical issue”).  
 101. Alschuler, supra note 100, at 1251 (describing the two-week “strike” that helped to persuade 
Los Angeles judges to revise their sentencing policies). See also Brandon Buskey, When Public 
Defenders Strike: Exploring How Public Defenders Can Utilize the Lessons of Public Choice Theory 
To Become Effective Political Actors, 1 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 533, 537–38 (2007) (discussing a 
public defender strike in St. Louis, Missouri, which the chief public defender described as an attempt 
to end practices of meeting and pleading). 
 102. See Complaint at 24, Phillips v. California, No. 15CECG02201 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jul. 14, 
2015), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/file_stamped_phillips_v_state_of_ 
alifornia_complaint.pdf. 
 103.  Cf. Alschuler, supra note 100, at 1252–53 (“In this way, the lawyer’s traditional duty to 
serve his client without reservation may become a device for quieting opposition to injustice and for 
perpetuating unfairness from one case to the next.”). 
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the settlement process undermines the legitimacy of a system predicated 
on individual guilt and moral responsibility.
104
 
Even as many argue that prosecutor’s offices dictate the terms of most 
settlements,
105
 many cases settle on terms that bear scant relationship to 
any conscious policy. Common settlement outcomes often reflect shared 
courtroom cultures, local norms, and boilerplate settlement terms. In this 
way, standardized pleas ignore “the facts and circumstances of individual 
cases,”106 and instead categorically apply the same punishment to each 
defendant based largely on the local jurisdiction’s treatment of the charged 
crime. In fact, the relatively fixed “market price” for a plea is generally a 
function of history—current plea deals are based almost entirely on the 
sentences that similar defendants pled to in the past.
107
  
B. The Pitfalls of Aggregate Settlement Civil, Administrative and Criminal 
Law 
Ordinarily, policymakers and courts embrace settlement as an 
important adjunct to our court system—producing superior outcomes that, 
when negotiated privately and at arm’s-length, presumably reflect the 
merits of any given case. Informally aggregated settlement, however, 
complicates all these features of private negotiation in civil, 
administrative, and criminal law, undermining the ability of our public 
dispute resolution system to promote legitimacy, loyalty, accuracy, and the 
development of substantive law. 
First, aggregated settlements undermine legitimacy when clients lack 
input and control over the outcome. Aggregate settlements do not involve 
privately negotiated bargains controlled by, or with significant input from, 
each individual party. They instead involve systematic “take-it-or-leave-it” 
deals dictated by a small number of brokers, institutions, or default “going 
 
 
 104. Cf. Natapoff, supra note 10, at 1084 (describing how the concern “with individual guilt and 
moral responsibility [is] giving way to an ‘actuarial’ approach to justice concerned with management 
of groups”). 
 105. Lynch, supra note 10, at 2132 (“The frequent disparity of power between the prosecutor and 
the defendant makes the role-definition of the prosecutor particularly important to the outcome of the 
negotiation.”). 
 106. Natapoff, supra note 10, at 1070. 
 107. See HEUMANN, supra note 18, at 120 (describing how plea deals set “precedent” for future 
deals and how prosecutors follow “habits of disposition”); Natapoff, supra note 10, at 1070 (“[T]he 
extent of punishment is [determined] by reference to the local ‘price’ for certain offenses.”); David 
Sudnow, Normal Crimes: Sociological Features of the Penal Code in a Public Defender Office, 12 
SOC. PROBS. 255 (1965) (observing that public defense attorneys developed an expertise in classifying 
and describing their cases according to patterns, identifying case similarities in large groups, and 
recharacterizing them as “normal crimes”).  
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rates.” In multidistrict litigation and private “settlement mills,” insurance-
like grids determine payouts for victims of defective drugs, toxic 
exposure, and even seemingly disconnected automobile accidents. In 
administrative settlements, animal feeding operations and medical 
providers may be stuck with flat payouts, while mortgage banks sign 
boilerplate agreements denying liability. Criminal pleas, particularly in 
high-volume misdemeanor cases, categorically apply the same punishment 
based largely on local norms and private “sentencing alternatives” 
determined by the local prosecutor’s office. Even when clients appreciate 
the value of a settlement, administrative offer, or plea, they may have had 
little choice or ability to shape the ultimate outcome. 
Second, aggregated settlements undermine loyalty when high case 
volumes require that attorneys serve disparate interests in a system that 
rarely involves pure arm’s-length transactions. Many systematic 
settlements rely on repeat players who may sacrifice their clients, or the 
public interest, for other unrelated goals. In blockbuster deals that resolve 
cases like Vioxx and September 11 Litigation, commentators worried that 
the same group of lawyers anxious to recoup their fees and quickly resolve 
the litigation pushed individual clients to settle their claims.
108
 Although 
administrative settlements do not involve private clients, agencies may 
sacrifice the public interest in exchange for headline-grabbing awards that 
“quiet the public furor quickly and shift the formulation” of how to divvy 
up multi-million dollar settlements for another day.
109
 In criminal law, 
prosecutors exploit their bargaining power to adopt categorical settlement 
policies that, in some cases, bear only a weak relationship to the 
substantive offense, while public defender offices broker mass pleas under 
the weight of crushing caseloads. Public defenders, although hard pressed 
to admit it, also know that hard bargaining for one client may jeopardize a 
plea with the same prosecutor’s office for another client.110  
Third, informally aggregated settlements undermine accuracy when 
ready-made settlements blur characteristics or overlook the merits of 
different kinds of cases. The high volume of aggregated cases means that 
parties may lack information or time to resolve cases according to their 
merits. Multidistrict litigation favors volume over knowledge; attorneys 
 
 
 108. See supra notes 46–49 and accompanying text. 
 109. S.E.C. v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 626 F. Supp. 2d 402, 405 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); see also Sonia A. 
Steinway, Comment, SEC “Monetary Penalties Speak Very Loudly,” But What Do They Say? A 
Critical Analysis of the SEC’s New Enforcement Approach, 124 YALE. L.J. 209 (2014) (arguing the 
SEC’s focus on attention-getting fines against corporations undermines more effective, targeted 
sanctions against individual wrongdoers).  
 110. See HEUMANN, supra note 18, at 62–63. 
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with large numbers of claims receive coveted positions on steering 
committees that shape the litigation, at the expense of attorneys with small 
numbers of meritorious claims. The sheer number of asbestos, hip-
replacement or toxic exposure cases requires counsel to “bundle” or 
“damage average” cases. Bulk administrative payouts and settlements, like 
those recently offered by Medicare and the EPA, similarly “bundle” cases, 
rewarding strong and weak claims alike.
111
 Finally, defense counsel and 
prosecuting attorneys in misdemeanor cases lack time and incentives to 
collect all but the most superficial information in a “system of pleas,” and 
not of trials.
112
 In criminal cases, “standardized pleas cannot be assumed to 
reflect defendant culpability, the availability of defenses, or the strength of 
the evidence.”113  
Finally, aggregation may frustrate the “rule of law” when interested 
parties cannot evaluate outcomes on an individual basis because of limited 
resources, crushing caseloads, and repeat players subject to “group think.” 
Organizational norms may lead repeat steering committee members and 
claim handlers to streamline completely unrelated personal injury accident 
cases according to the same standard operating procedure.
114
 Federal 
agencies increasingly rely on centralized enforcement divisions and 
boilerplate settlements to set policy. And while the term “plea bargaining” 
suggests that the prosecutor and the defense attorney haggle over the 
appropriate sentence much like traders in a Turkish bazaar,
115
 going rates 
often determine the defendant’s plea to a charge, just like in civil 
litigation.
116
 In these ways, aggregate settlement “may dim our capacity to 
see injustice,”117 distorting the incentives for attorneys to develop facts, or, 
 
 
 111. See supra notes 67–71 and accompanying text.  
 112. See Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S.Ct. 1376, 1388 (2012); see also Robert E. Scott & William J. 
Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1912 (1992) (identifying various critiques 
of plea bargaining, including “the unfairness (and inaccuracy) of determining defendants' fate without 
full investigation, without testimony and evidence and impartial factfinding”). 
 113. Natapoff, supra note 10, at 1071. 
 114. See ROSS, supra note 9, at 22 (finding that the system of insurance adjustment for automobile 
accidents “is individualistic mainly in theory; in practice it is categorical and mechanical, as any 
system must be if it is to handle masses of cases in an efficient manner”). 
 115. See Scott & Stuntz, supra note 112, at 1912 (describing plea bargaining as “allocating 
criminal punishment through what looks like a street bazaar”). 
 116. See Lynch, supra note 10, at 2130 (“The rules are more like those of the supermarket than 
those of the flea market: there is a fixed price tag on the case, and you will get no farther ‘bargaining’ 
with the prosecutor than you will by making a counteroffer on the price of a can of beans at the 
grocery.”). See also HEUMANN, supra note 18, at 188–89 n.19; FEELEY, supra note 18, at 187; Josh 
Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1117, 1146 (2008) (“Bargains are struck 
according to ‘going rates’—known and somewhat fixed starting-point prices.”); Bibas, supra note 17, 
at 2483 n.78 (“[B]argaining is tempered by stable going rates for ordinary crimes . . . .”). 
 117. Resnik, From “Cases” to “Litigation”, supra note 38, at 65. 
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for that matter, judges’ ability to articulate substantive law for large 
groups of cases.  
II. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF AGGREGATE SETTLEMENTS  
Concerns about legitimacy, loyalty, accuracy, and the rule of law have 
produced disarray. The current judicial response to the rise of bureaucratic 
settlement has been that some courts have sought to assure “adequate” 
representation for parties in criminal, civil, and administrative settlements. 
Unfortunately, when judges intervene to review the substance of 
settlements on their own, they may violate the interests of the parties, 
upset the separation of powers, or stretch the limits of judicial 
competency. Judges who themselves participate and sometimes benefit 
from repeat settlements also may be poorly suited to substantively review 
the quality of those agreements.  
Section A describes the current, ad hoc judicial response to the rise of 
aggregation in civil, administrative, and criminal law. Section B describes 
the challenges for judges who try to review informally aggregated 
settlements. 
A. Ad Hoc Judicial Responses to Aggregate Settlement Practice 
In response to the rise of aggregation, some courts have intervened in 
aggregate settlement practice in civil, criminal, and administrative law. 
But precisely because aggregate settlement represents a mixture of 
individualized contract and bureaucratic dispute resolution, courts have 
struggled to define how and when they can competently review such 
settlements.  
1. Judicial Review of Aggregate Civil Settlements 
Over the years, judges in complex civil litigation have struggled to 
identify what role, if any, they should play when large numbers of 
seemingly individual cases settle together in multidistrict consolidations or 
private settlement mills. Unlike class action rules that expressly require 
judges to review the overall fairness of any settlement, no formal rules 
govern how judges should review informally aggregated settlements. 
Nevertheless, judges have intervened to police multidistrict and other 
private aggregate settlements out of a concern that, like class actions, such 
massive deals may raise conflicts of interest, lose sight of individual 
litigants, and produce results divorced from the merits of the disputes.  
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In multidistrict litigations involving thousands of plaintiffs with 
billions of dollars in liability claims,
118
 courts have created new doctrines 
to police problems of loyalty, legitimacy, accuracy, and the rule of law.
 119
 
First, judges may police attorneys who they worry may lack incentives to 
faithfully represent the interests of many very different clients. Shortly 
before a deadline to settle a large number of similar cases arising out of 
exposure to toxic chemicals at Ground Zero, Judge Hellerstein noticed a 
surge of 185 voluntary dismissals on the eve of the settlement deadline.
120
 
The judge was “[t]roubled” by the apparent surge of dropped claims 
because, under the arrangement negotiated between hundreds of plaintiff 
and defense counsel, plaintiff attorneys’ fees increased as a greater share 
of existing claimants settled with defendants.
121
 Accordingly, Judge 
Hellerstein sua sponte ordered a hearing to determine whether the clients 
authorized the dismissals. At the hearing, the district court learned that the 
clients did not explicitly authorize counsel to dismiss their claims, but had 
simply not responded to counsel’s inquiries by the settlement deadline.122 
Judges will rarely know as much about negotiated settlements and 
practices as the attorneys who appear before them. But in mass cases, like 
the September 11 cases, they may intervene because they occupy a unique 
position to detect unusual settlement patterns, pose questions to counsel, 
and unearth more information about obscure mass practices.  
Second, and relatedly, judges may intervene to make up for the 
diminished role of individual client participation and consent in large “off-
 
 
 118. See, e.g., In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 650 F. Supp. 2d 549, 552–53 & n.7 (E.D. La. 2009) 
(discussing the Vioxx Settlement Agreement and its authorizations to the court); In re Diet Drugs 
(Phentermine, Fenfluramine, Dexfenfluramine) Prods. Liab. Litig., 553 F. Supp. 2d 442, 456–59 (E.D. 
Pa. 2008); In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 04–MD–1596, 2008 WL 2511791, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. 
June 19, 2008); In re Air Crash Disaster at Florida Everglades on Dec. 29, 1972, 549 F.2d 1006, 1012 
(5th Cir. 1977). See also Richard L. Marcus, Cure-All for an Era of Dispersed Litigation? Toward a 
Maximalist Use of the Multidistrict Litigation Panel’s Transfer Power, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2245 (2008). 
 119. Judge Weinstein first proposed that courts should supervise mass consolidations, like class 
actions, referring to them as “quasi-class actions.” Weinstein, supra note 20, at 480–81 (“What is clear 
from the huge consolidations required in mass torts is that they have many of the characteristics of 
class actions. . . . It is my conclusion . . . that mass consolidations are in effect quasi-class actions. 
Obligations to claimants, defendants, and the public remain much the same whether the cases are 
gathered together by bankruptcy proceedings, class actions, or national or local consolidations.”). See 
also Transcript of Status Conference at 54:14-24, 62:24, 63:8-12, In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site 
Litig., No. 21 MC 100 (AKH) (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2010) (“Most settlements are private; a plaintiff and 
defendant come together, shake hands, and it’s done with. Although the judge may look and see if 
there’s some infant or some compromise or something else, basically it’s the parties that decide. . . . 
This is different. This is 9/11. This is a special law of commons. This is a case that’s dominated my 
docket, and because of that, I have the power of review.”). 
 120. In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 754 F.3d 114, 119 (2d Cir. 2014).  
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
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the-rack” settlements. Because many administrative aggregations lead to 
boilerplate settlements based on a small number of categories and 
variables, courts may conduct “fairness hearings” and videoconferences to 
ensure victims have some say in massive settlement agreements offered on 
a “take-it-or-leave-it” basis. They may go even further to police 
relationships between lawyers and their more remote clients—setting aside 
complex, individual settlements when the court believes attorneys charge 
too much for their work or disagrees with the substance of the settlement 
award.
123
 As Judge Jack B. Weinstein once wisely observed: 
“Theoretically, each client has the option of rejecting his share of a 
settlement. . . . In practice the attorney almost always can make a global 
settlement and convince the clients to accept it.”124  
Third, judicial review promotes accuracy. Courts may issue “core 
discovery” orders that require initial disclosures, code huge databases of 
claimants’ personal information, conduct sample trials, or schedule 
bellwether settlements to understand how the resolution of one case will 
impact similar cases and ensure outcomes consistent with their merits.
125
 
Perhaps most notably, Judge Eduardo Robreno quickly resolved over 
180,000 asbestos claims in an MDL proceeding long known as the “black 
hole” or the “roach motel” of American litigation—where cases checked 
in, but never checked out. He did so by helping the steering committees of 
 
 
 123. See, e.g., In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 650 F. Supp. 2d at 565 (upholding the cap of 
originating attorney’s fees at 32% with the caveat that “in the rare case where an individual attorney 
believes a departure from this cap is warranted, he shall be entitled to submit evidence to the Court for 
consideration”); In re Guidant Corp. Implantable Defibrillators Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 05-1708 
(DWF/AJB), 2008 WL 682174, at *10 (D. Minn. Mar. 7, 2008) (noting that “Plaintiffs’ counsel 
achieved a global settlement of $240,000,000.00 for 8,550 Plaintiffs” and “that many of the individual 
cases likely are not strong stand-alone cases” and using this to justify the amount of the common 
benefit award). 
 124. Weinstein, supra note 20, at 521 n.212. 
 125. In the September 11 cases, for example, Judge Hellerstein appointed two special masters to 
gather and code detailed personal information about all of the 11,000 claims in a searchable database. 
Information gleaned from the database helped the parties select “test cases” to value and understand 
how the resolution of one case would impact other similar cases. According to the court, the massive 
electronic database assured more accurate awards by identifying: 
correlations between the ages of plaintiffs and the severities of injuries suffered and whether 
the length of the plaintiffs’ exposure to the WTC site increased the severity of injury. Thus, 
by adding or subtracting from the criteria reflected in the various fields one could discern 
which factors strongly correlated with the severity of injury and which factors had a lesser 
impact, or no impact at all. 
Alvin K. Hellerstein et al., The 9/11 Litigation Database: A Recipe for Judicial Management, 90 
WASH. U. L. REV. 653, 658 (2013). 
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lawyers find ways to identify and sort large numbers of very different 
claims, shortly after he took over the process.
126
  
Notwithstanding the reasons for judges to intervene in multidistrict 
settlements, commentators fear that judges who do so may frustrate 
litigants’ choices, lack critical information, or aggrandize power without 
clear guidance or rules. First, like class actions, judges may appoint and 
compensate “lead lawyers” who do not have any clients, replacing parties’ 
chosen counsel with experienced lawyers who the judges believe will 
more competently coordinate motions and settle large groups of cases.
127
 
Second, MDL courts, like those reviewing class action settlements, lack 
information to verify whether the settlement process itself will produce 
fair outcomes. Finally, some worry that judges who review aggregated 
settlements assume unchecked administrative power to control the 
settlement process—particularly, where no formal rule exists to guide 
judges who police the very aggregate settlements they often encourage in 
multidistrict litigation.
128
 Judge Hellerstein, reflecting on the lack of 
guidance for judges in multidistrict litigation, observes:  
On the one hand, if I was right in asserting supervisory control of 
the litigation and rejecting the initial settlement, then those powers 
should be clearly set forth so that the next judge who faces these 
issues does not feel overly constrained for fear of appellate reversal. 
On the other hand, if I was wrong, then an explicit rule should 
define the proper constraints.
129
 
The deep ambivalence over the judicial role in aggregate civil settlements 
extends beyond multidistrict litigation. Although rarer, judges also have 
intervened in private aggregated settlements involving a variety of cases—
from those involving oil spill and toxic waste claim facilities to 
agreements governing mortgage and debt adjustment practices. For 
 
 
 126. See Hon. Eduardo C. Robreno, The Federal Asbestos Product Liability Multidistrict 
Litigation (MDL-875): Black Hole or New Paradigm?, 23 WIDENER L.J. 97 (2013). See also DUKE 
LAW CTR. FOR JUDICIAL STUDIES, STANDARDS AND BEST PRACTICES FOR LARGE AND MASS TORT 
MDLS 42, 110 (2d rev. ed. 2014), https://law.duke.edu/sites/default/files/centers/judicialstudies/ 
standards_and_best_practices_for_large_and_mass-tort_mdls.pdf (“The initial case-management order 
should inform counsel that the leadership structure will be discussed at the initial case-management 
conference and direct them to be prepared to identify case-specific issues that may inform the 
appropriate structure.”). 
 127. Silver & Miller, supra note 61, at 149; Burch, supra note 20, at 86. 
 128. Grabill, supra note 8, at 126–27 (arguing that courts should not have authority to review non-
class aggregate settlements); Linda S. Mullenix, Dubious Doctrines: The Quasi-Class Action, 80 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 389 (2011) (criticizing the use of “quasi-class actions”). 
 129. Alvin K. Hellerstein et al., Managerial Judging: The 9/11 Responders’ Tort Litigation, 98 
CORNELL L. REV. 127, 177 (2012). 
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example, following the Deepwater Horizon explosion, BP created a 
sophisticated private claim process to resolve millions of claims outside 
any formal court process, opening claim offices in strip malls across the 
Gulf that promised thirty-minute, one-on-one sessions with any injured 
person wishing to file a claim for compensation. Fearful that the BP fund 
might fail to accurately compensate parties pressured to settle under severe 
financial strain following the spill, judges (1) enjoined BP from asking 
people to waive their rights to sue in exchange for compensation; (2) 
regulated the kinds of statements BP could make to potential litigants; and 
even (3) considered imposing fees against those who filed with the BP 
fund to financially support attorneys pursuing separate claims against BP 
in federal court.
130
  
Other courts have limited high-volume plaintiff offices from 
categorically resolving large groups of similar personal injury claims with 
repeat insurance agencies, employers, and other defendants. In Johnson v. 
Nextel Communications, Inc.,
131
 for example, the Second Circuit allowed 
parties to challenge a private dispute resolution process for a large group 
of clients, brokered by the same law firm against their employer. Among 
other things, the agreement included tight time frames for claimants to 
participate and resolve their claims. The agreement also reduced plaintiff 
counsels’ fee awards, on a sliding scale, when they failed to persuade 
clients to meet those deadlines or participate in the settlement. By entering 
into the deal, according to the Second Circuit, the plaintiffs’ former 
lawyers “violated [their fiduciary] duty to advise and represent each client 
individually, giving due consideration to differing claims, differing 
strengths of those claims, and differing interests in one or more proper 
tribunals in which to assert those claims.”132  
Courts have never firmly resolved, however, how far judges may go to 
upset a private aggregate settlement. Out of respect for the parties’ interest 
in settling group cases, the Second Circuit in Nextel notably left the scope 
of its opinion unclear. The Second Circuit cautioned that its decision 
should not “necessarily preclude” such “group treatment” of claims in 
arm’s-length bargains “where manageable numbers of claimants are 
 
 
 130. See Colin McDonell, Comment, The Gulf Coast Claims Facility and the Deepwater Horizon 
Litigation: Judicial Regulation of Private Compensation Schemes, 64 STAN. L. REV. 765, 772–80 
(2012).  
 131. 660 F.3d 131 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 132. Id. at 140. 
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involved” and “defendants are not paying the claimants’ lawyer to 
aggregate the claims.”133 
2. Judicial Review of Aggregate Agency Settlements  
In administrative law, some courts have also asserted their authority to 
review aggregate settlement practices. Like judges who review class 
actions and other private aggregate settlements, these judges worry that 
public officials who forge mass, pro forma agreements undercut the 
administrative agency’s ability to faithfully represent the public interest, 
legitimately hear from interested stakeholders in a transparent fashion, and 
reach settlement agreements that accurately reflect the seriousness of the 
alleged misconduct.  
To some extent, the struggle to identify the proper judicial role in the 
review of agency settlements arises from the nature of the agreements 
frequently struck between agencies and regulated parties, which are called 
“consent decrees.” When agencies choose to resolve a dispute with 
another party, they frequently file that agreement with a court. The 
resulting “consent decree” gives the court continuing power to see that the 
agreement is followed and to punish a party that violates the agreement 
with contempt sanctions.
134
 Because consent decrees represent a blend of 
private contract and public “decree,” courts have always struggled to 
define their role in the approval of such settlements.
135
 The Supreme 
Court, for example, has long said that “[p]arties to a suit have the right to 
agree to any thing they please” in consent decrees and judges, “when 
applied to, will ordinarily give effect to their agreement.”136 At the same 
time, judges must remain “free to reject agreed-upon terms as not in 
furtherance of statutory objectives [and] . . . to modify the terms of a 
consent decree” when laws change.137  
 
 
 133. Id. at 140 n.4. 
 134. The Securities and Exchange Commission, the Federal Trade Commission, and other 
regulatory enforcement agencies regularly follow this approach, although the practice has been 
changing.  
 135. For an extensive, thoughtful discussion of this historical tension, see Judith Resnik, Judging 
Consent, 1987 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 43, 50–63 (1987). 
 136. Pac. R.R. v. Ketchum, 101 U.S. 289, 297 (1879). Judges must also enforce the bargain made 
by the parties, instead of considering the purposes of the legislation that gave rise to the underlying 
action. United States v. ITT Cont’l Baking Co., 420 U.S. 223, 236–37 (1975); Swift & Co. v. United 
States, 276 U.S. 311 (1928).  
 137. Sys. Fed’n No. 91 v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642, 651 (1961). See also Aaron v. S.E.C., 446 U.S. 
680, 701 (1980); United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 114 (1932).  
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Although the hybrid nature of consent decrees has spawned a scholarly 
debate about the appropriate role of judicial review in agency settlements, 
aggregate agency settlement practice changes the calculus even more. As 
set out below, some courts express concerns that repeat settlements permit 
agencies to adopt new policies that depart from their statutory mission, fail 
to involve stakeholders or the public interest in those decisions, and avoid 
accurately assessing whether serial punishments reflect the wrong alleged. 
Thus, much like private aggregate settlements, judicial concerns about 
loyalty, legitimacy, and accuracy have encouraged courts to scrutinize 
repeat agency settlement practices.  
Perhaps the most famous proponent of increased judicial oversight of 
pro forma agency settlement practice is Judge Jed Rakoff in the Southern 
District of New York. In the past few years, Judge Rakoff has rejected 
several similar private settlements between the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) and private parties that raised concerns about loyalty, 
legitimacy, and accuracy.
138
 In rejecting a multi-million dollar agreement 
between the SEC and Bank of America, he openly worried the settlement 
reflected a “cynical relationship between the parties”—that the SEC sold 
out the public in what he believed to be a low-ball settlement.
139
 Judge 
Rakoff’s complaints about the SEC’s position on consent decrees echo 
what others have said about large sweetheart deals in private aggregate 
litigation—that government consent decrees represent a “failure of the 
adversary system” to bring to light problems the settlement would pose for 
third parties because both parties—prosecutor and defendant—agree.140  
 
 
 138. S.E.C. v. Vitesse Semiconductor Corp., 771 F. Supp. 2d 304 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); S.E.C. v. 
Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328, 332 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); S.E.C. v. Bank of Am. Corp., 
653 F. Supp. 2d 507, 512 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 139. Bank of Am. Corp., 653 F. Supp. 2d at 512 (Rakoff, J.) (“The proposed Consent Judgment in 
this case suggests a rather cynical relationship between the parties: the S.E.C. gets to claim that it is 
exposing wrongdoing on the part of the Bank of America in a high-profile merger; the Bank’s 
management gets to claim that they have been coerced into an onerous settlement by overzealous 
regulators.”). 
 140. Compare Jed S. Rakoff, Are Settlements Sacrosanct?, 37 LITIG. 15, 16–17 (2011) (“Once the 
parties of record have settled, they have no incentive to apprise the court of respects in which the 
settlement might be argued to be unfair, unreasonable, or inadequate.”) with Silver & Miller, supra 
note 61, at 133–34 (describing “structural collusion” between plaintiff and defense counsel in 
multidistrict litigation that impairs judicial oversight), Alon Klement, Who Should Guard the 
Guardians? A New Approach for Monitoring Class Action Lawyers, 21 REV. LITIG. 25, 42–43 (2002) 
(discussing various forms sweetheart deals can take in class actions and mass tort cases), and John C. 
Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff's Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for Private 
Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669, 714 (1986) 
(“Often, the plaintiff's attorneys and the defendants can settle on a basis that is adverse to the interests 
of the plaintiffs.”).  
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In another order denying approval of a proposed consent judgment 
proffered by the SEC and Citigroup Global Markets Inc. (Citigroup), 
Judge Rakoff described the problem such repeat settlements create for 
legitimacy. He worried about the impact such blanket settlement policies 
would have on third parties likely to be impacted by the judgment, as well 
as the rule of law, when courts passively review agency settlements.
141
 He 
argued: 
Purely private parties can settle a case without ever agreeing on the 
facts, for all that is required is that a plaintiff dismiss his complaint. 
But when a public agency asks a court to become its partner in 
enforcement [without knowledge of the facts] . . . , the court 
becomes a mere handmaiden to a settlement privately negotiated on 
the basis of unknown facts, while the public is deprived of ever 
knowing the truth in a matter of obvious public importance.
142
 
Although most do not think of Judge Rakoff’s decisions in Citigroup as a 
form of aggregate settlement, chief among his concerns was the SEC’s 
seemingly repeat and reflexive approach to its own settlement agreements. 
Reviewing the SEC’s handling of over 200 consent decrees, the court 
found that the SEC settlements, among other things: (1) routinely failed to 
require defendants to admit or deny liability; (2) did not account for the 
interests of shareholders; and (3) never pursued corporate violations of the 
terms of the same consent decrees. Accordingly, Judge Rakoff pressed for 
more information to support the terms of the instant agreement, without 
which he could not find that the agreement was “fair, nor reasonable, nor 
adequate, nor in the public interest.” 143 
Judge Rakoff’s decision encouraged a large number of federal district 
judges to follow suit—expressing concern that rubber-stamped, repeat 
agreements between the SEC, Federal Trade Commission, and other 
government agencies and corporate wrongdoers distort and dilute the 
judicial role, while subordinating the public good to the private interests of 
the parties.
144
 
 
 
 141. See Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d at 332.  
 142. Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 143. Id.  
 144. See, e.g., S.E.C. v. CR Intrinsic Inv’rs, LLC, 939 F. Supp. 2d 431, 436–37 (S.D.N.Y. 
2013) (Marrero, J.) (disputing the idea that “Congress intended the judiciary’s function in passing 
upon these settlements as illusory, as a predetermined rubber stamp for any settlement put before it by 
an administrative agency, or even a prosecutor ”) (emphasis added); Transcript of Status Conference 
Hon. Richard J. Leon U.S. Dist. Judge at 9:2, 9:10–14, S.E.C. v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., No. 11–cv–
00563–RJL (D.D.C. Dec. 20, 2012) (Leon, J.), ECF No. 10 (“This is not a rubber stamp court . . . . 
This Court has had a lot of SEC enforcement cases, and I don’t just sign it and turn it over. I am part of 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss3/5
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Remarking that “[i]t is not . . . the proper function of federal courts to 
dictate policy to executive administrative agencies,”145 the Second Circuit, 
however, reversed Judge Rakoff’s order. In so doing, the Second Circuit 
required that judges only review consent decrees for procedural 
infirmities, like unclear language, lack of consent, and collusion. Although 
Judge Rakoff worried that the SEC might ignore its mission in settling 
large groups of cases through categorical practices, the Second Circuit 
worried more about what the growing number of decisions like Judge 
Rakoff’s might mean for party-autonomy, judicial competency, and the 
separation of powers. By limiting judicial review to only the most basic 
contract formalities, the Second Circuit adopted a very different view of 
judicial power: one that was supposed to give effect to the parties’ wishes 
and respect how a coordinate branch of government exercised its 
prosecutorial discretion. 
In Association of Irritated Residents, the judges reviewing the 
“industry-wide” settlement in the EPA’s global agreement over animal 
feeding operations raised similar concerns, highlighting how aggregate 
consent decrees challenge judges who hope to protect the integrity of the 
judicial process while respecting the interests of the parties and the 
separation of powers. A divided panel of the D.C. Circuit Court of 
Appeals not only blessed the EPA’s settlement, but ultimately said it was 
an unreviewable act of prosecutorial discretion.
146
 Writing for the 
majority, Judge Sentelle characterized the Agreement as a routine 
enforcement action: “The Agreement merely defers enforcement of the 
statutory requirements, and makes that deferral subject to enforcement 
conditions that will ultimately result in compliance.”147 Moreover, the 
Agreement fell well within the bounds of the EPA’s enforcement 
discretion. After all, the statute already described the Agency’s 
enforcement authority in “permissive terms.”148 
Judge Rogers, in dissent, focused on the aggregate nature of the EPA’s 
settlement process. She found that the aggregation of individual cases 
transformed the settlement into a kind of public law that demanded 
judicial review to ensure agencies lived up to their statutory mission, heard 
 
 
a growing number of District judges in the country who have grown increasingly concerned about that 
kind of conduct . . . .”); F.T.C. v. Circa Direct LLC, Civil No. 11–2172 RMB/AMD, 2012 WL 
589560, at *1 (D.N.J. Feb. 22, 2012) (Bumb, J.) (“Recently, the propriety of courts approving 
settlements of regulatory actions, similar to the Order at issue here, has been questioned.”). 
 145. S.E.C. v. Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., 673 F.3d 158, 163 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 146. Ass’n of Irritated Residents v. E.P.A., 494 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
 147. Id. at 1033. 
 148. Id. at 1032. 
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from the public, and calibrated enforcement actions to those who deserved 
it. “[B]y imposing a civil penalty on AFOs in the absence of 
individualized determinations of statutory violations,” Judge Rogers 
wrote, the “EPA has attempted to secure the benefits of legislative 
rulemaking without the burdens of its statutory duties.”149 The EPA had, in 
effect, abandoned individual enforcement actions for “an unauthorized 
system of nominal taxation of regulated entities.”150 Treating the global 
settlement like any other garden-variety enforcement action, according to 
Judge Rogers, frustrated the courts’ ability to assure that the agency 
loyally interpreted the will of Congress, allowed public participation, and 
accurately applied the law to the facts.  
Association of Irritated Residents highlights the different challenges 
aggregation presents for the judicial review of settlements. Like other 
forms of bureaucratic settlement, the global agreement in that case allowed 
the EPA to dramatically change “the regulatory environment for an entire 
industry,”151 without Congress, public input, or any case-by-case 
assessment of animal feeding operations themselves. The terms of the 
agreement offered to each AFO were identical; only the amount of the 
“fine” varied among them, based on their size, and not the degree to which 
any one operation violated the Clean Air Act. 
But Judge Sentelle’s opinion also underscored the danger that judicial 
involvement posed to the separation of powers and the rights of the parties 
to independently resolve problems through contract. As a general rule, 
when Congress vests authority in an agency to enforce the law, that 
agency has the discretion to decide whether a particular violation of the 
law warrants prosecution, compromise, or other enforcement action.
152
 
The EPA’s agreement is not very different from how agencies frequently 
exercise their prosecutorial discretion to enforce the law—consistently, 
and hopefully, according to an informed policy.
153
 If the EPA could simply 
have considered, and declined, to bring individual enforcement actions 
against every animal feeding operation, then why shouldn’t the EPA 
 
 
 149. Id. at 1037 (Rogers, J., dissenting). 
 150. Id. 
 151. Deacon, supra note 67, at 815.  
 152. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985). 
 153. See Sunstein, The Most Knowledgeable Branch, supra note 72, at 12 (“[W]ithin the executive 
branch, there is a great deal of deliberation, and it often involves people with diverse perspectives and 
high levels of technical expertise.”); Zachary S. Price, Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty, 67 
VAND. L. REV. 671, 768 (2014) (“We live under a vast accretion of civil and criminal prohibitions, 
softened in application by (hopefully) benevolent enforcers who may produce a law on the ground 
very different from the law on the books.”); Peter L. Strauss, The President and Choices Not To 
Enforce, 63 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 107, 110–11 (2000).  
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resolve those cases more efficiently in an aggregate settlement? The 
majority was unable to draw a meaningful line between individual 
settlement agreements—which courts do not review out of respect for the 
agencies’ authority to contract—and more creative aggregate agreements 
that, according to the dissent, jeopardize public and deliberative 
lawmaking.
154
  
3. Judicial Review of Aggregate Criminal Settlements 
Much like their civil and administrative counterparts, judges have 
wrestled with how to properly preside over an aggregated criminal 
settlement process. Just as consent decrees transform private agreements 
into public “decrees,” criminal settlements necessarily involve judges in 
the implementation of the “contract” and require the court to “place its 
imprimatur” on the parties’ agreed-upon resolution.155 Moreover, when 
criminal cases are resolved through an aggregate settlement process, they 
not only impact the defendant, but also incrementally change rules that 
govern how the entire justice system functions. In this way, criminal 
settlements involve both the formation of criminal justice policy as well as 
its implementation.
156
 As a result, criminal settlements often pit judges’ 
duty to protect the integrity of judicial proceedings against their obligation 
to respect prosecutors’ “broad discretion to enforce the Nation’s criminal 
laws.”157 
While courts recognize that they should play some practical role in 
policing the loyalty, legitimacy, and accuracy of a criminal dispute system 
dominated by repeat settlements, the exact parameters of that role are 
difficult to identify. This problem is exacerbated by the different ways in 
which criminal charges can be resolved—deferred prosecution 
 
 
 154. Cf. Crowley Caribbean Transp., Inc. v. Peña, 37 F.3d 671, 677 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (warning that 
“a broad policy against enforcement poses special risks that [the government] ‘has consciously and 
expressly adopted a general policy that is so extreme as to amount to an abdication of its statutory 
responsibilities’” (quoting Chaney, 470 U.S. at 833 n.4)); Kenney v. Glickman, 96 F.3d 1118, 1123 
(8th Cir. 1996). 
 155. United States v. Orthofix, Inc., 956 F. Supp. 2d 316, 325 (D. Mass. 2013) (“[I]n accepting a 
plea bargain and moving thereafter to sentence the defendant, the court places the imprimatur of 
legitimacy, as an independent branch of government, on the parties’ bargain.”). 
 156. See Eric J. Miller, Policy By Numbers: Judicial Policy-Making In Low-Level Criminal 
Courts (manuscript on file with authors).  
 157. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (internal quotation marks omitted); see 
also Rebecca Krauss, The Theory of Prosecutorial Discretion in Federal Law: Origins and 
Developments, 6 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 1, 4 (2009) (“According to modern case law, the separation 
of powers doctrine requires judges to permit broad prosecutorial discretion.”). 
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agreements, pleas with advisory sentences, and what are known as “take it 
or leave it” pleas.  
First, some judges assert authority to review criminal settlements that 
never result in a formal plea agreement, like “deferred prosecution 
agreements.” In a deferred prosecution, a prosecutor initiates a case 
against a defendant but defers prosecution in exchange for some form of 
punishment or rehabilitative effort.
158
 Once the defendant has satisfied his 
side of the bargain, the prosecutor dismisses the case without ever 
securing a criminal conviction. Prosecutors first used deferred prosecution 
agreements (DPAs) as an alternative to more formal plea agreements in 
order to rehabilitate juvenile and drug offenders.
159
 The use of DPAs in 
corporate criminal cases grew dramatically after the Arthur Andersen 
firm’s collapse, when the Department of Justice (DOJ) adopted policies 
requiring prosecutors to take into account the severe collateral 
consequences of indicting or convicting large corporations.
160
 
DPAs present a significant challenge to judges seeking to police the 
“integrity of the judicial process.”161 Yet while federal courts have 
traditionally approved DPAs with little or no scrutiny,
162
 some courts have 
sought to exercise their limited authority over DPAs to ensure that 
prosecutors adequately represent the public interest and that the 
aggregated settlement process produces legitimate and accurate outcomes. 
For example, when state and federal prosecutors agreed to defer their 
prosecution of HSBC Bank for helping Mexican and Colombian drug 
traffickers launder over $881 million in drug trafficking proceeds, they 
ostensibly relied on the executive branch’s exclusive authority over the 
decision whether or not to prosecute.
163
 This particular agreement, 
however, was drafted in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis in a period of 
growing public criticism of the government’s pattern of using DPAs to 
 
 
 158. Benjamin M. Greenblum, Note, What Happens to A Prosecution Deferred? Judicial 
Oversight of Corporate Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1863, 1864 (2005). 
 159. Id. 
 160. Zimmerman & Jaros, supra note 85, at 1407; see also Memorandum from Larry D. 
Thompson, Deputy Attorney Gen., to the Heads of Dep’t Components, U.S. Attorneys § II.A (Jan. 20, 
2003) (instructing prosecutors to consider the “collateral consequences” of indictment on 
“shareholders, pension holders and employees not proven personally culpable”). 
 161. See United States v. Goodson, 204 F.3d 508, 514 (4th Cir. 2000) (describing courts’ “general 
supervisory power to… preserve the integrity of the judicial process”).  
 162. Zimmerman & Jaros, supra note 85, at 1408 (“Courts . . . only rarely review DPAs . . . .”); 
see also Greenblum, supra note 158, at 1869 (“The decision to defer is generally not subject to judicial 
review unless an applicable statute provides otherwise.”). 
 163. United States v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., No. 12–CR–763, 2013 WL 3306161, at *1, *8 
(E.D.N.Y. July 1, 2013). 
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resolve cases involving large financial institutions without seeking 
criminal convictions.
164
  
Openly acknowledging the public’s concern that no corporation should 
be “too big to jail,” Judge Gleeson balked at the government’s pro forma 
request to toll the speedy trial statute to allow the deal to take effect and 
asserted that he had the right to review the substance of the DPA just as he 
would a plea.
165
 He then ordered the parties to explain in writing why the 
agreement “adequately reflect[ed] the seriousness of the offense behavior 
and why accepting the DPA would yield a result consistent with the goals 
of our federal sentencing scheme.”166 
At a second hearing, Judge Gleeson rejected the parties’ arguments that 
he lacked the authority to evaluate whether the DPA was in the public’s 
interest. The judge readily acknowledged he had no authority to review the 
government’s decision not to seek a criminal conviction;167 however, he 
reasoned that the parties had “implicated” the court in their agreement by 
filing criminal charges and that his “supervisory power” over the 
proceedings gave him the authority to evaluate the substance of the 
DPA.
168
  
The court’s initial decision to review the agreement was motivated, in 
part, by concerns typically raised about aggregate settlement practices. 
Judge Gleeson expressed concern that the DOJ’s repeat decisions to 
resolve corporate criminal cases with DPAs threatened the “integrity of 
judicial proceedings.”169 Moreover, his requirement that the government 
justify the terms of the agreement marked a “novel”170 exercise of 
supervisory authority—ensuring that the DOJ adequately represented the 
public’s interest and that the DPA was a fair and accurate resolution of the 
criminal charges.
171
 
 
 
 164. See id. at *7 (explaining that the court was “aware of the heavy public criticism of the 
DPA”).  
 165. Id. at *2–4. 
 166. Id. at *1. 
 167. Id. at *5 (“The government has absolute discretion to decide not to prosecute.”). 
 168. Id. at *4–5. 
 169. Id. at *4. 
 170. Id. at *6 (“I recognize that the exercise of supervisory power in this context is novel.”). 
 171. More recently, the DC Circuit rejected this approach, finding district courts lack the 
competence and authority to reject a DPA. See United States v. Fokker Servs. B.V., 818 F.3d 733 
(D.C. Cir. 2016). The Court reasoned that courts were poorly equipped to second-guess a prosecutor’s 
settlement decisions and that such judicial scrutiny infringed the Executive’s core function under the 
Take Care Clause. Id. at 741 (citing U.S. Const. art. II, § 3).  But see Note, D.C. Circuit Holds that 
Courts May Not Reject Deferred-Prosecution Agreements Based on Inadequacy of Charging 
Decisions or Agreement Conditions, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1048, 1053 (2017) (arguing this conclusion 
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Unlike deferred prosecutions, courts enjoy formal, but limited authority 
to accept or reject plea agreements: in the federal system, judges may not 
participate in plea discussions
172
 and, in many federal cases, must accept 
the prosecutor’s sentencing recommendation. For example, a judge 
reviewing a “take it or leave it” plea under Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 11(c)(1)(C) must either accept the prosecutor’s sentencing 
recommendation or allow the defendant the opportunity to withdraw his 
plea and proceed to trial.
173
  
While many judges “rubber stamp” the plea deals prosecutors work out 
with defendants,
174
 some have rejected the notion that they have no role to 
play in supervising a system of aggregated criminal settlements. In a 2012 
decision, Judge William Young rejected two separate “take it or leave it” 
pleas offered by the Department of Justice. Importantly, the judge’s 
decision did not rest solely on his concern that the proffered pleas failed to 
adequately punish the defendants.
175
 In his decision rejecting the pleas, 
Judge Young explained, “for the Court to place its imprimatur on such a 
bargain, however agreeable to the executive—once aggregated together 
with similar decisions across the criminal justice system—results in the 
denigration of the criminal law.”176  
Judge Young’s rejection of the defendants’ plea bargains reflects the 
same concerns for accuracy, loyalty, and legitimacy that can be identified 
in courts’ reviews of aggregated civil and administrative settlements. Not 
only did the court reject the plea for failing to impose sanctions accurately 
reflecting the severity of the defendants’ crimes,177 he openly questioned 
whether the prosecutor had loyally represented the public’s interest with 
such a lenient resolution.
178
 The judge also challenged the legitimacy of a 
settlement that appeared to be one of a “series of utilitarian compacts 
 
 
conflicts with the “panel’s statement that the purpose of the court’s approval authority is to ensure that 
the DPA will allow a defendant to demonstrate good conduct.”).
 
 172. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1). 
 173. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(5). 
 174. See Stephanos Bibas, The Myth of the Fully Informed Rational Actor, 31 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. 
L. REV. 79, 84 (2011) (explaining that most plea colloquies involve a recitation of “foregone 
procedural rights rather than the substantive merits” of the deal and “largely rubber stamp deals 
already struck”); see also United States v. Orthofix, Inc., 956 F. Supp. 2d 316, 317 (D. Mass. 2013) (“I 
[have] continued, rather reflexively, to accept ‘take it or leave it’ pleas from corporate criminals.”). 
 175. Orthofix, Inc., 956 F. Supp. 2d 316. 
 176. Id. at 334. 
 177. See id. at 335 (finding “the government's recommendation as to the appropriate fine” to be 
“strikingly low”). 
 178. Id. at 328 (“Because . . . the parties cannot be expected to dispense justice by themselves, it is 
incumbent upon the judge to ensure that justice is done when performing her function in vetting plea 
bargains and imposing sentences.”). 
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punctuated by blustering admonishments.”179 Ultimately, Judge Young’s 
rejection of the pleas was concerned not only with “robbing corrective 
justice in this particular case” but also that the systematic settlement of 
similar corporate cases with similarly lenient plea agreements was 
undermining “the normative edifice of the criminal law.”180  
Some commentators have accused Judge Young of overreach—
ignoring the rules of procedure and the parties’ wishes because, in his 
view, judges should more aggressively review plea bargains struck with 
corporations.
181
 They suggest that, in so doing, the court ignored the 
institutional consequences for prosecutors, agencies, and corporate 
defendants who jointly enter into such pleas after many different executive 
departments approve the deal.
182
 Introducing more uncertainty into the 
consequences of the criminal plea may undermine other aspects of a 
comprehensive deal also struck with the EPA and the Treasury to perform 
clean-up or reform shoddy banking practices.  
Even the Supreme Court has begun to grapple with the fact “that 
criminal justice today is for the most part a system of pleas, not a system 
of trials.”183 In its landmark Sixth Amendment decisions, Padilla v. 
Kentucky, Missouri v. Frye, and Lafler v. Cooper, the Court clarified that 
the right to effective assistance of counsel included the right to be 
informed of formal plea offers;
184
 the right to be advised (correctly) as to 
the collateral consequences of a plea,
185
 and the right of a defendant to 
receive competent advice before rejecting a plea offer.
 186
 Despite Justice 
Scalia’s dissenting admonition in Lafler “that bad plea bargaining has 
nothing to do with ineffective assistance of counsel in the constitutional 
sense,”187 the majority in Frye recognized that “plea bargains have become 
so central to the administration of the criminal justice system that . . . . it is 
insufficient simply to point to the guarantee of a fair trial as a backstop 
that inoculates any errors in the pretrial process.”188 
 
 
 179. Id. at 335. 
 180. Id. at 336, 337. 
 181. See Simms & Linehan, supra note 8, at 3–4.  
 182. See id. at 4. 
 183. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1388 (2012). See also Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 
1407 (2012) (“The reality is that plea bargains have become so central to the administration of the 
criminal justice system that defense counsel have responsibilities in the plea bargain process, 
responsibilities that must be met to render the adequate assistance of counsel that the Sixth 
Amendment requires in the criminal process at critical stages.”). 
 184. Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1408. 
 185. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 374 (2010). 
 186. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1385. 
 187. Id. at 1393 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 188. Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1407. 
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Although the Supreme Court has finally accepted what commentators 
and practitioners had asserted for some time—that plea bargaining is “‘not 
some adjunct to the criminal justice system; it is the criminal justice 
system’”189—the Court has not yet fully come to terms with the aggregate 
nature of the criminal settlement process. Despite some recognition that 
plea offers are largely uniform and predetermined by the large volume 
practice that characterizes the majority of criminal courts,
190 
the Court 
persists in characterizing the pleas as individualized “horse trading.”191 
Indeed, the Court has justified its reluctance to regulate the plea bargaining 
process precisely because it believes that it cannot effectively govern such 
a highly individualized process.
192 
As a result, even as the Court has 
recognized the primacy of pleas in the criminal justice system, the Court’s 
effort to regulate that process remains predicated on the presumption that 
ours continues to be a system of individualized justice. 
If, as we suggest, some plea bargaining is better viewed as aggregate 
settlement rather than individualized bargains, then the Supreme Court’s 
current approach to regulating the plea process is incomplete. Although 
Padilla, Lafler, and Frye guarantee each defendant a competent and loyal 
attorney in criminal settlement, that right is greatly diminished in a system 
in which trials are rare and the substance of the plea is largely 
predetermined.
193
 Although the Court’s remedies focus on providing 
defendants with competent counsel, the reality of aggregate settlement is 
that individual attorneys, regardless of their skill, have substantially less 
control over the outcomes of their cases.
194
 It is ironic that Anthony 
Cooper’s constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel in 
Lafler was violated precisely because his attorney’s incompetent advice 
denied him the plea that “others in his position would have received in the 
ordinary course.”195  
 
 
 189. Id. (citing Scott & Stuntz, supra note 112, at 1912). 
 190. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1387 (recognizing that “[t]he favorable sentence that [had] eluded the 
defendant” was one which he would have received “in the ordinary course, absent the failings of 
counsel”). 
 191. Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1407. 
 192. Id. at 1408 (“The alternative courses and tactics in negotiation are so individual that it may be 
neither prudent nor practicable to try to elaborate or define detailed standards for the proper discharge 
of defense counsel’s participation in the process.”). 
 193. See Alexandra Natapoff, Gideon Skepticism, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1049, 1052 (2013) 
(“The petty offense system generates cases and convictions by the millions in a speedy, low-scrutiny 
process in which outcomes are largely predetermined.”). 
 194. See id. at 1067 (“A different, smaller literature suggests that defense counsel cannot perform 
its assigned functions for structural reasons, not because lawyers lack the time or ability, but because 
the very nature of plea bargaining or sentencing prevents it.”). 
 195. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1387 (emphasis added). 
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Thus, while the Court’s recent jurisprudence contemplates a role for 
judges in policing criminal settlements, it has not fully resolved how 
judges should protect the integrity of an aggregate criminal justice process. 
In many respects, the Court’s refusal to embrace a role for judges in 
policing aggregate settlements in the criminal system reflects the 
recognition that, despite courts’ supervisory powers, significant obstacles 
exist that hamper judges’ ability to regulate aggregate settlements on their 
own. 
B. Challenges to Judicial Oversight of Aggregated Settlement 
The informal aggregation of settlements suggests that courts can no 
longer—if they ever could—rely on adversarial, case-by-case decision-
making to produce fair and accurate outcomes. Unfortunately, however, 
judges are substantially constrained in their ability to police informally 
aggregated settlements by the limits of their own judicial competence, the 
constitutional demands imposed by the separation of powers, and their 
need to respect the interests of the parties. 
Judges often lack the information and expertise to ensure adequate 
representation at critical stages in the settlement process. First, judges are 
not privy to all the information that motivates parties to strike a deal. 
Judges lack critical details about the substance of the claims and the 
parties’ interests and risk tolerance. Even when judges raise questions 
about settlements produced by the cookie-cutter application of accepted 
norms, judges may lack sufficient knowledge to either critique the 
attorneys or offer an acceptable substitute. 
Judges also may lack the perspective to effectively craft settlements 
that are not shaped primarily by institutional memory. Because judges 
work inside the very system that they are obliged to monitor and protect, 
they may base their sentences on “going rates” as much as prosecutors and 
defense attorneys. Indeed, the Supreme Court acknowledged as much in 
Frye.
196
 Moreover, judges cannot claim to be immune to the pressures that 
 
 
 196. Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1410 (“It can be assumed that in most jurisdictions prosecutors and judges 
are familiar with the boundaries of acceptable plea bargains and sentences.”); see also Ronald Wright 
& Marc Miller, The Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, 55 STAN. L. REV. 29, 80 (2002) (“Custom dictates 
the sentence more than the arguments of counsel do. . . . District Court judges in the parish operate in 
the same building and are aware of the sentencing habits of their colleagues. This setting keeps the 
judges aware of the ‘going rate’ for various crimes committed by various types of offenders.”); Jeff 
Yates & Elizabeth Coggins, The Intersection of Judicial Attitudes and Litigant Selection Theories: 
Explaining U.S. Supreme Court Decision-Making, 29 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 263, 267 (2009) 
(“[C]ases with clear-cut outcomes often have associated ‘going rates,’ or shared views of how judges 
might decide the appropriate sentence for a given offense.”). 
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can lead cases to be settled in the aggregate. Like the attorneys who come 
before them, judges are susceptible to the pressures of overwhelming 
caseloads. As a result, courts may lack incentives to identify problems in 
an aggregate process in which they are highly invested.
197
 
Not only may judges lack the competence to effectively supervise 
aggregated settlements, but constitutional concerns regarding the 
separation of powers also impede the judiciary from seizing control of the 
settlement process. Despite invoking his supervisory authority to monitor 
the HSBC DPA, Judge Gleeson was forced to concede that DPAs are “not 
the business of the courts” and that the executive branch has the exclusive 
discretion not to prosecute.
198
 The same separation of powers concerns 
animated the Second Circuit when they rebuked Judge Rakoff for 
attempting to dictate the terms of the SEC’s settlement with Citibank.199 
Civil cases do not raise the same separation of powers concerns because 
they arise between private parties. But some commentators raise similar 
concerns when judges fashion remedies through settlements that look like 
legislation or appear to aggrandize judicial power.
200
 
Finally, courts remain reluctant to interfere in settlements out of respect 
for the right of each party to resolve cases in their perceived best interests. 
A defendant may not have a constitutional right to plea bargain,
201
 but 
judges are justifiably hesitant to obstruct a resolution that the defendant is 
willing to accept in lieu of trial. Moreover, judges recognize that the 
parties to a dispute have the right to resolve their differences outside of the 
courthouse. Informally aggregated cases are a significant challenge to 
judges precisely because there is no obvious role for judges to play in a 
 
 
 197. William B. Rubenstein, The Fairness Hearing: Adversarial and Regulatory Approaches, 53 
UCLA L. REV. 1435, 1468 (2006) (observing the concerns associated with judicial review over 
complex settlements); Colin S. Diver, The Judge as Political Powerbroker: Superintending Structural 
Change in Public Institutions, 65 VA. L. REV. 43, 45 (1979) (“Th[e] transformation in the character of 
litigation necessarily transforms the judge’s role as well.”). 
 198. United States v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., No. 12-CR-763, 2013 WL 3306161, at *5 
(E.D.N.Y. July 1, 2013). 
 199. S.E.C. v. Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., 673 F.3d 158, 163 (2d Cir. 2012) (“It is not, however, 
the proper function of federal courts to dictate policy to executive administrative agencies.”). 
 200. See, e.g., James A. Henderson, Jr., The Lawlessness of Aggregative Torts, 34 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 329, 338 (2005); Donald G. Gifford, The Constitutional Bounding of Adjudication: A Fuller(ian) 
Explanation for the Supreme Court’s Mass Tort Jurisprudence, 44 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1109, 1154–56 
(2012); Jonathan T. Molot, An Old Judicial Role for a New Litigation Era, 113 YALE L.J. 27, 30 
(2003); Linda S. Mullenix, Mass Tort as Public Law Litigation: Paradigm Misplaced, 88 NW. U. L. 
REV. 579 (1994). But see Ewing & Kysar, supra note 24, at 410 (suggesting that the separation of 
powers should not be read so expansively as to preclude courts from prodding sister branches into 
action). 
 201. Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 561 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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process that at least superficially only involves the parties named in the 
case. 
The challenge for judges, then, is to identify a role they can play in 
supervising the integrity of the settlement process given the very 
significant constraints on their ability to evaluate the substance of 
agreements and to dictate terms to the parties. As we discuss below, 
judges can play a productive role in minimizing some of the risks of 
aggregated settlement, while supporting the integrity of a legal system that 
aspires to provide consistent but individual justice. 
III. TOWARDS A NEW MODEL OF JUDICIAL REVIEW OF AGGREGATE 
SETTLEMENT 
A. Judicial Review to Prod Aggregate Settlement Reform 
The aggregation of individual settlement practices requires a rethinking 
of the role of judicial review in a world of bureaucratic settlement. In this 
part, we argue for a model of judicial review that plays a modest, but 
critical role in mass settlement: managing the flow of information 
throughout the settlement process to press other institutions—government 
lawyers, private associations of attorneys, and the coordinate branches of 
government—to examine their institutional approach to those aggregated 
cases.  
Such review would not mean interfering with the final outcome of any 
given settlement. Indeed, judges need not exercise this power in every 
instance involving a pattern of repeat settlements. Rather, judges would 
simply be alert for opportunities to improve the settlement process by 
demanding more information about the parties’ competing interests in 
settlement, more participation by outside stakeholders, and more reasoned 
explanations for the trade-offs made by counsel on behalf of similarly 
situated parties. In so doing, courts may help protect the process, 
substance and rule-of-law values threatened by recurring settlements.  
The aggregation of settlement—and the judicial response to it that we 
discuss above—challenges two dominant views about the judicial role in 
our modern system of governance. Under one line of thought, the 
“classical” model, judges enable “private ordering” through our public 
system of dispute resolution.
202
 That is, people ordinarily resolve disputes 
on their own, and when they cannot, courts provide a neutral public forum 
 
 
 202. Chayes, supra note 3; FULLER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 3, at 705–08.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
592 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 94:545 
 
 
 
 
to arbitrate disputes between a limited number of plaintiffs and 
defendants,
203
 determine the parties’ entitlement to discrete legal remedies 
based on past events,
204
 and rely on facts and arguments the parties choose 
to present.
205
 Afterwards, later disputants can use the precedent established 
in that earlier case to resolve similar cases in court or, more commonly, 
through individual settlements brokered in “the shadow of the law.”206  
This narrow view of judges as “umpires” who neutrally arbitrate 
disputes reflects a concern that a more activist, “managerial” judging style 
would violate the parties’ due process rights,207 not to mention the 
separation of powers,
208
 particularly when judicial review curbs actions of 
democratically elected members of the legislative or executive branches of 
government. 
Another line of thought, the “public” model, imagines a very different 
kind of adjudication. The public model captures cases commonly 
associated with structural reform litigation—where judges do more than 
hear one-on-one disputes arising out of past events, but instead oversee 
“polycentric” disputes, using flexible case management and equitable tools 
to declare what is right and wrong, with sweeping implications for large 
groups of people before the court.
209
 This model does not view “adequate 
representation” as a due process problem, but instead, largely considers 
whether the proceeding will accurately reflect interest-group politics.
210
 
 
 
 203. John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 824–
25 (1985) (critiquing the American embrace of neutral judicial decision-making, while recognizing 
more active, inquisitorial judicial management of “Big Case” multi-party disputes). But see Marc 
Galanter et al., The Crusading Judge: Judicial Activism in Trial Courts, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 699, 706–
08 (1979) (describing active judicial management in small claims court cases).  
 204. G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 14–16 (Expanded 
ed. 2003); FRANCIS HILLIARD, THE LAW OF TORTS OR PRIVATE WRONGS 75 (1874) (“The liability to 
make reparation . . . rests upon an original moral duty, enjoined upon every person, so to conduct 
himself or exercise his own rights as not to injure another.”) (emphasis omitted).  
 205. STEPHAN LANDSMAN, THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM: A DESCRIPTION AND DEFENSE 38 (1984); 
Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 383 (1978). 
 206. Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 16, at 968; Chayes, supra note 3, at 1288 (“Although it 
was well that particular disputes should be fairly settled, there was comfort in the thought that the 
consequences of the settlement would be confined to the individuals involved.”). 
 207. See Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 425 (1982) (arguing that 
granting judges procedural control over actions transforms the judges into managers and creates 
“opportunities for judges to use—or abuse—their power”). 
 208. See, e.g., Henderson, supra note 200, at 338 (“In exercising these extraordinary powers, 
courts arguably exceed the legitimate limits of both their authority and their competence.”). 
 209. Chayes, supra note 3, at 1297–98 (“With the diffusion of the party structure, fact issues are 
no longer sharply drawn in a confrontation between two adversaries, one asserting the affirmative and 
the other the negative. The litigation is often extraordinarily complex and extended in time, with a 
continuous and intricate interplay between factual and legal elements.”). 
 210. See Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 
1667, 1723–47 (I975); Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 
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Although advocates of this model recognize that it pushes the limits of 
judicial power, they claim the public model makes up for a dysfunctional 
democratic system that often ignores discrete interest groups otherwise 
unable to register grievances at the ballot box.
211
 
But neither model adequately captures the problems associated with 
informally aggregated settlements. Unlike the classic model, in repeat 
“take-it-or-leave-it” settlements, judges cannot depend on formal, public 
dispute resolution between two adversaries to protect parties’ rights and 
ensure due process and the legitimate evolution of law. As demonstrated 
above, informal aggregation means that parties often resolve whole 
categories of civil, administrative, and criminal cases with little 
individualized input, according to established norms untethered from 
substantive law. 
But unlike the public model of adjudication—where the court actively 
supervises all of the parties and the application of broad prospective 
remedies—the parties in informally aggregated settlements often appear 
before the court only one at a time, if at all. Consequently, even though 
informal aggregate settlements may impact as many people as public law 
adjudication, judges that participate in informal aggregate settlements 
cannot easily monitor and police the public and private bureaucracies 
responsible for dispensing justice. For the same reasons, courts cannot 
micromanage informal aggregations that often take place outside the 
courthouse without threatening separation of powers and disturbing party 
autonomy. 
A new model would recognize that informal aggregate settlement blurs 
the lines between the private and public models of judging. Even when 
courts hear traditional disputes between just a few parties, their decisions 
can impact out-of-court institutions responsible for concluding large 
groups of similar cases, with the same sweeping impact as public 
litigation. But such a model would also have to acknowledge the limits 
courts themselves have recognized on their own power. Policing aggregate 
 
 
UCLA L. REV. 1, 32–36 (1997) (illustrating instances of interest group participation and 
recommending a new “collaborative model” to involve groups in decision-making). 
 211. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 76 
(1980) (stating that courts “keep the machinery of democratic government running as it should, to 
make sure the channels of political participation and communication are kept open” and thus should 
concern themselves “with what majorities do to minorities”); Chayes, supra note 3, at 1315 
(“Moreover, one may ask whether democratic theory really requires deference to majoritarian 
outcomes whose victims are prisoners, inmates of mental institutions, and ghetto dwellers.”). But see 
Neil K. Komesar, Taking Institutions Seriously: Introduction to a Strategy for Constitutional Analysis, 
51 U. CHI. L. REV. 366 (1984) (questioning whether courts provide a superior forum to address 
interests of underrepresented minority groups). 
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settlement requires help from institutions outside the court—prosecutors, 
agencies, and even steering committees of private lawyers—to apply 
complementary approaches to protecting the integrity of our public dispute 
resolution process.  
In other areas of public law, commentators have begun to recognize 
that, even under the classical model, judicial decisions generate dialogue 
to improve the way other public institutions make public policy.
212
 
Benjamin Ewing and Doug Kysar, for example, thoughtfully observe that 
courts do more than operate within a system of “checks and balances” that 
curbs government overreach.
213
 Judicial decisions also can “prod and 
plea”—sparking an exchange of ideas between other institutions to protect 
citizens from “government under-reach,” when the risks of inaction, in a 
system of divided government, threaten the public interest.  
For that reason, they provocatively argue that courts should entertain 
questions related to climate change in public nuisance litigation, even 
though the coordinate branches arguably possess more legitimate authority 
and expertise to do so. In such cases, courts should not dodge the merits 
by raising standing, political question, or other concerns grounded in the 
separation of powers. Rather, they should reach the merits of those cases, 
understanding that even losses promote greater openness and deliberation. 
Accordingly, judges should perform their traditional official roles, but 
with “a self-conscious appreciation for the ways in which they can signal 
 
 
 212. See Ewing & Kysar, supra note 24, at 410 (“In the face of many twenty-first century harms, 
however, ‘pluralism’ requires not only multiple values, but also multiple institutions.”); Douglas 
NeJaime, Winning Through Losing, 96 IOWA L. REV. 941, 941 (2011) (recognizing that even court 
defeats “appeal to other state actors, including elected officials and judges, through reworked litigation 
and nonlitigation tactics”); Wendy Wagner, When All Else Fails: Regulating Risky Products Through 
Tort Litigation, 95 GEO. L.J. 693, 728 (2007) (“A second and perhaps larger lesson for institutional 
reformists is the need to combine institutions in a way that maximizes their respective capabilities to 
correct or compensate for underlying participatory imbalances.”); David A. Sklansky, Quasi-
Affirmative Rights in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 88 VA. L. REV. 1229 1232–33 (2002) 
(suggesting that courts adopt “strategies designed to promote ongoing dialog between the judiciary on 
the one hand and the political branches on the other”). Others recognize how multiple institutional 
perspectives offer more information and perspectives to identify and solve problems. See Matthew C. 
Stephenson, Information Acquisition and Institutional Design, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1422 (2011) 
(observing that redundant institutions reveal private information, aggregate disparate information, and 
facilitate learning); Adrian Vermeule, Second Opinions and Institutional Design, 97 VA. L. REV. 1435, 
1452 (2011) (observing that overlapping institutional roles facilitate “perspectival aggregation,” as 
agents may offer a diversity of problem solving approaches).  
 213. Ewing & Kysar, supra note 24, at 411–12 (“Whether it is a legislature that succumbs to 
dysfunction or a court that abdicates its duty to adjudicate, when one branch falls down on the job, the 
elusive goal of balance may be thwarted just as much as when one branch usurps authority entrusted to 
another.”). 
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to other institutional actors that a given problem demands attention and 
action.”214 
Even though Ewing and Kysar write with extremely complex cases in 
mind, in some ways, their model of adjudication fits squarely within the 
classical framework.
215
 Judges should not shy away from getting to the 
merits of a private nuisance dispute just because they worry their decision 
might overlap with that of another branch of government.
216
 But they also 
are mindful of the courts’ institutional role when judges decide such cases. 
Courts should adjudicate such disputes with an understanding that they 
can spur other public and private actors better positioned to respond to 
such problems.  
To date, most literature that advocates that judges consciously open 
dialogue among other institutions focuses on those rare cases resolved by 
courts, as opposed to the overwhelming number that settle.
217
 Perhaps the 
closest analogy may be found in the judicial reaction to the rise of public 
bureaucracy and administration. As public agencies and regulation 
blossomed in the early 1970s, courts attempted to strike an appropriate 
balance between deferring to public authorities charged with acting in the 
public interest and their own institutional obligation to “say what the law 
is.” Courts settled on a doctrine of “hard look” review, where courts 
review an agency’s decisions to ensure that the agency deliberates and 
explains the basis for its actions. Under “hard look review,” courts do not 
substitute their own judgment for complex policymaking decisions. 
Rather, they encourage public actors to act more deliberately and faithfully 
by requiring agencies to “explain the evidence which is available” and 
“offer a rational connection between the facts found and the choice 
 
 
 214. Id. at 354. 
 215. See id. at 378 (“Notwithstanding a dramatic factual backdrop, recent climate change nuisance 
suits remain unequivocally tort actions.”). 
 216. See id. at 375 (“[W]hen courts contract the common law’s scope through justiciability 
doctrines . . . [to avoid] a politically wrought issue, any suggestion they might make about whether or 
how the legislature should act comes wrapped in a self-effacing (if not self-vitiating) disclaimer: . . . 
[that] the court lacks the institutional authority to suggest that other branches take any particular 
action, or even act at all.”).  
 217. David M. Jaros, Preempting the Police, 55 B.C. L. REV. 1149, 1152 (2014) (suggesting state 
courts apply the “intrastate preemption doctrine” in judicial opinions to prod legislators to provide 
greater guidance about police activities that they condone); NeJaime, supra note 212, at 941 
(recognizing that even court defeats “appeal to other state actors, including elected officials and 
judges, through reworked litigation and nonlitigation tactics”); Wagner, supra note 212, at 728 (“A 
second and perhaps larger lesson for institutional reformists is the need to combine institutions in a 
way that maximizes their respective capabilities to correct or compensate for underlying participatory 
imbalances.”); Sklansky, supra note 212, at 1232–33 (suggesting that courts adopt “strategies designed 
to promote ongoing dialog between the judiciary on the one hand and the political branches on the 
other”). 
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made.”218 Hard look review respects the technical and policy judgments of 
a public bureaucracy, while demanding reasoned decision-making to 
“guard against precisely the kinds of infidelities that lie at the core of the 
agency cost problem in administrative law.”219 
Even though this kind of review arose in response to the growth of 
public bureaucracies, a similar inter-branch dialogue is needed to protect 
against the rising private bureaucracy of settlement. Judicial input may be 
required to improve the process by which institutions reach a settlement, 
whether those institutions include federal prosecutors, agencies, steering 
committees, or private claim facilities responsible for processing large 
volumes of similar cases. 
First, as we discussed in Part I, cases that settle in groups deserve more 
public scrutiny and regulation than individually negotiated contracts, as 
parties lose individual control over their terms and conditions. Just as 
some argue that boilerplate contracts assume the character and form of 
public law,
220
 the same arguably holds true for “take-it-or-leave-it” 
settlements offered to large groups of people. Group settlements can 
reshape legal obligations and entitlements for large numbers of 
stakeholders,
221
 but without input and oversight from interest groups, 
courts, agencies, and legislatures ordinarily responsible for forming and 
interpreting social regulations. Judicial review, in some cases, can bring 
 
 
 218. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 52 (1983) 
(internal quotation marks omitted in second quote). 
 219. Richard A. Nagareda, Turning from Tort to Administration, 94 MICH. L. REV. 899, 945 
(1996); see also Catherine M. Sharkey, Federalism Accountability: “Agency-Forcing” Measures, 58 
DUKE L.J. 2125, 2181 (2009) (describing hard look review as a tool used “to ensure that agencies 
disclose relevant data and provide reasoned responses to material objections raised during the 
rulemaking process”). 
 220. MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, AND THE 
RULE OF LAW 96 (2013) (arguing that “consent in the robust sense expressed by the ideal of ‘freedom 
of contract’ is arguably absent in the vast majority of the contracts we enter into these days, but its 
absence does little to affect the enforceability of these contracts”) (internal quotation marks omitted); 
Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1176 
(1983) (“The use of standard form contracts grows from the organization and practices of the large, 
hierarchical firms that set the tone of modern commerce. The relationships of such businesses to their 
customers and to the legal system generate a dynamic that accounts for the salient features of contracts 
of adhesion.”); W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking 
Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529, 531 (1971); Lewis A. Kornhauser, Unconscionability in Standard 
Forms, 64 CALIF. L. REV. 1151, 1166 (1976); Arthur Allen Leff, Contract as Thing, 19 AM. U. L. 
REV. 131 (1970); Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion—Some Thoughts About Freedom of 
Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629 (1943); Edwin W. Patterson, The Delivery of a Life-Insurance 
Policy, 33 HARV. L. REV. 198, 222 (1919).  
 221. Cf. Richard A. Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof, 84 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 97, 104 (2009) (“Aggregate proof frequently offers . . . an implicit demand for a new and often 
controversial conception of the substantive law that governs the litigation.”). 
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dysfunctional mass settlement practices out of the shadows and into public 
view. 
Second, judicial intervention also may improve the quality and 
deliberation that outside institutions devote to the settlement process. 
Settlements change when institutions know they must justify outcomes to 
generalist judges, who (sometimes) sit outside the echo-chamber of repeat-
settlement arrangements. Moreover, as judges review serial settlements 
between similar classes of plaintiffs and defendants, they may see 
settlement patterns among classes of claims that others cannot see in 
isolation. Courts thus play an important role in encouraging other 
institutions responsible for repeat settlements—prosecutors, agencies, and 
specialized practitioners—to thoughtfully design contracts that govern 
many people, when they otherwise may not be able to do so themselves.
222
 
Our view of informal aggregate settlements thus supports decisions by 
lower court judges to demand more information about deals that reflect 
problematic, but standard, settlement practices. Judicial supervision of 
mass settlement practice can prod other institutions to develop richer 
perspectives about large numbers of cases that otherwise may go 
unnoticed, and thus, more effectively encourage reform. In so doing, 
courts would attempt to account for the impact of their decisions not only 
on precedent, but on the institutional actors that churn the courts’ 
decisions into their own mass settlement program.  
B. Judicial Review of Settlement Practices in Action 
Our model sheds a different light on judicial opinions that—under the 
classical model of adjudication—could be criticized or rebuked as 
improper assertions of judicial power in civil, administrative, and criminal 
law. But our model also points to where courts may go too far. The ability 
of judges to “prod and plea” supports judges who use their power to 
facilitate discussion, demand attention to important issues, and prompt 
responses from other institutional actors responsible for mass settlement. 
Courts, however, should resist overturning or rejecting settlements based 
on the substance of their agreements, which falls outside judicial 
 
 
 222. Cf. Dan T. Coenen, A Constitution of Collaboration: Protecting Fundamental Values with 
Second-Look Rules of Interbranch Dialogue, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1575 (2001); Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1185, 1198 (1992) (“[J]udges play an 
interdependent part in our democracy. They do not alone shape legal doctrine but . . . they participate 
in a dialogue with other organs of government, and with the people as well.”). 
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competency, raises separation of powers concerns, and in some cases, may 
jeopardize the parties’ settlement options. 
1. Complex Civil Litigation 
At first blush, private institutions, like bar associations and steering 
committees of attorneys, seem like an unlikely fit for our model of judicial 
review of settlements. Those who advocate “prods and pleas” generally 
imagine a more robust dialogue between the coordinate branches of 
government. But private institutions, just like their public counterparts, 
can benefit from judicial input in their approach to settling thousands of 
ostensibly similar cases. In complex civil litigation, this more dynamic 
version of judicial review may support judges in multidistrict litigation 
who: (1) use “facilitative judging”223 to inform the settlement process; 
(2) help parties evaluate important trade-offs in global agreements; and 
(3) supervise attorney’s fees for individual parties in multidistrict 
litigation. 
First, in facilitative judging, judges in multidistrict litigation avoid 
forcing plaintiffs and defendants to settle in groups. They instead focus 
their resources on helping the parties develop their own system to manage 
the flow of information necessary to resolve cases in a variety of ways—
sometimes through initial disclosure requirements, motion practice, and 
court-annexed mediation. For example, Judge Eduardo Robreno 
successfully resolved over 180,000 asbestos claims in less than five years 
by helping the steering committees of lawyers identify ways to sort large 
numbers of very different claims early in the process.
224
 Judge Hellerstein 
similarly helped parties create a “core discovery database,” requiring 
counsel to produce and code the personal and medical histories for 10,000 
September 11 workers to assist the parties in evaluating more than 200 
different types of injuries for their eventual global settlement.
225
 Judge 
Brian R. Martinotti developed a unique “bellwether settlement” process to 
encourage repeat-litigators to share information they ordinarily would 
not—particularly when preparing for high-stakes bellwether trials.226  
 
 
 223. Dodge, supra note 51; Georgene Vairo, Lessons Learned by the Reporter: Is Disaggregation 
the Answer to the Asbestos Mess?, 88 TUL. L. REV. 1039 (2014) (describing the author’s discussions 
with judges in Texas and Pennsylvania who were doing the same). 
 224. Robreno, supra note 126. 
 225. Hellerstein et al., supra note 129, at 143–44; see also Hellerstein et al., supra note 125. 
 226. See generally Adam S. Zimmerman, The Bellwether Settlement, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2275 
(2017) (providing case study of Judge Martinotti’s bellwether mediation process to resolve thousands 
of hip implant cases).  
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Judges themselves sometimes say that “facilitative judging” represents 
just another version of the classical adjudication model—letting “lawyers 
be lawyers” by forcing advocates to develop facts to support their 
respective positions.
227
 But they understate the way judicial intervention 
improves the decision-making process of the lawyers themselves in the 
settlement process. Many judges, for example, now impose case 
management orders that allow parties to put up information about the 
merits of their disputes early in the process, inverting federal rules that 
ordinarily require parties to develop evidence later in the proceeding.
228
 
What courts have learned, however, is that such a process can produce 
vital information for institutions responsible for settling large groups of 
claims, enabling them to identify the relative merits of many different 
claims early, and thus reducing the pressure and cost for steering 
committees of attorneys to develop facts that apply to all of the potential 
claims.
229
 
Judicial prodding may also encourage private and public institutions to 
revisit difficult trade-offs and produce creative settlements. A recent 
example outside of multidistrict litigation is the National Football League 
settlement involving players suffering from traumatic brain injuries. 
Skeptical that a $765 million umbrella settlement fund was large enough 
to cover 20,000 NFL players suffering from different traumatic brain 
injuries for sixty-five years, Judge Anita Brody demanded the negotiating 
steering committees produce more actuarial details to determine whether 
the fund would remain solvent.
230
 The court’s investigation prompted the 
parties to agree to settle all cases without any cap on liability (the 
settlement instead adopted an agreed-to payout formula for individual 
 
 
 227. Robreno, supra note 126, at 188; Vairo, supra note 223, at 1058. 
 228. See J. Maria Glover, The Federal Rules of Civil Settlement, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1713 (2012) 
(outlining, and then criticizing, pretrial rules of procedure that fail to advance dispute resolution given 
the modern reality of frequent settlements). 
 229. Attorneys in multidistrict litigation frequently complain that, without facilitative judging, 
incentives in mass proceedings perversely lead to the opposite result: steering committees of attorneys 
knowing less information about large volumes of cases, even as they attempt to settle them in large 
volume. This is because MDL judges often appoint counsel to coveted positions on steering 
committees based on the number of plaintiffs they represent to develop common evidence. Thus, the 
early incentives in the litigation favor bulk collection and lengthy litigation over common issues 
instead of individual evaluation of case files. By forcing parties to evaluate their cases early, judges 
may relieve pressure on steering committees to resolve the big abstract questions first, and make 
settlement discussions more concrete and viable. See supra notes 50–51 and accompanying text. 
 230. In re Nat’l Football League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 961 F. Supp. 2d 708 (E.D. Pa. 
2014). 
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retirees that took into account players’ age and illness).231 The parties’ 
creative response to the judge’s inquiry, in the end, reduced the 
appearance that the settlement favored football players with current 
injuries over those likely to manifest symptoms in the future, while 
improving the chance that an appeals court would approve the grand 
bargain.
232
 
A borderline question involves the highly-charged issue over whether 
federal judges should supervise attorney’s fees in multidistrict litigation.233 
At first blush, our model would seem to bar judges from substantively 
altering attorney’s fee agreements. Some argue, for example, that MDL 
courts may even inadvertently skew lawyers’ incentives to develop 
important information when judges, and not individual parties, set the 
price for legal services. When MDL judges select and control attorney 
compensation, “lead attorneys rarely challenge them,” because “[i]n 
practical effect, MDL judges [become] lead lawyers’ clients.”234  
But judges also may unearth important information for the settlement 
process when they supervise attorney’s fees. First, judges in multidistrict 
litigation occupy a unique position to create standing orders that may 
expose unsavory side-deals or conflicts with third-party financiers who 
fund the litigation.
235
 Second, when judges establish procedures for 
 
 
 231. In re Nat’l Football League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 301 F.R.D. 191 (E.D. Pa. 
2014). 
 232. In re Nat’l Football League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 821 F.3d 410, 433 (3d Cir. 
2016) (“The Fund is uncapped and inflation-adjusted, protecting the interests of those who worry 
about developing injuries in the future.”).  
 233. Compare, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 30 cmt. 
b (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 3, 2004) (“By comparison with [fee awards in] class actions, 
court-imposed fees to appointed counsel in consolidated litigation frequently appear inconsistent with 
restitution principles, since litigants may have no choice but to accept and pay for certain legal services 
as directed by the court.”), with In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 650 F. Supp. 2d 549, 565 (E.D. La. 
2009) (upholding the cap of originating attorney’s fees at 32% with the caveat that “in the rare case 
where an individual attorney believes a departure from this cap is warranted, he shall be entitled to 
submit evidence to the Court for consideration”).  
 234. Silver & Miller, supra note 61, at 109–10; Judith Resnik, Money Matters: Judicial Market 
Interventions Creating Subsidies and Awarding Fees and Costs in Individual and Aggregate 
Litigation, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 2119, 2129 (2000) (“Judges now have the power of payment, serving 
more like clients and consumers . . . .”). 
 235. Cf. Mark Hamblett, Plaintiffs’ Lawyers in 9/11 Cases Lose Bid To Recoup Interest Costs, 
N.Y. L.J. (Aug. 30, 2010) (describing decision prohibiting parties from charging clients $6.1 million in 
interest costs from third-party financing), http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/id=120248357 
9123/Plaintiffs-Lawyers-in-911-Cases-Lose-Bid-to-Recoup-Interest-Costs?slreturn=20160925153240; 
Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Financiers as Monitors in Aggregate Litigation, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1273, 
1331–32 (2012) (arguing that funding agreements should be disclosed to prevent collusion between 
attorneys and financiers who might aspire to influence or control litigation decisions); Memorandum 
from the Hon. David G. Campbell, Chair of Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules, to the Hon. Jeffrey S. 
Sutton, Chair of Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure 3–4 (Dec. 2, 2014) (“[J]udges currently 
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resolving conflicts over “common benefit work” fees—i.e., fees for work 
that benefits all of the plaintiffs in the litigation—they help the parties 
themselves produce valuable information for the settlement process, while 
managing concerns about free-riding
236
 and excessive costs.
237
 
Finally, our model of review would not necessarily support judicial 
decisions that set aside complex, individual settlements because a court 
disagrees with the substance of the settlement award.
238
 Others, for 
example, have argued that Judge Hellerstein lacked power to reject a 
settlement that would have resolved 10,000 September 11 claims.
239
 While 
other models might justify judicial intervention in such cases,
240
 a judicial 
decision that only says a settlement award is too high
241
 will not improve 
information and deliberation in the settlement process itself.  
 
 
have the power to obtain information about third-party funding when it is relevant in a particular 
case.”), http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/CV12-2014.pdf. 
 236. See Dennis E. Curtis & Judith Resnik, Contingency Fees in Mass Torts: Access, Risk, and the 
Provision of Legal Services When Layers of Lawyers Work for Individuals and Collectives of Clients, 
47 DEPAUL L. REV. 425, 444 (1998) (“The worry is about ‘free riders’ who obtain clients and receive, 
by private contract, significant percentages of the clients’ recoveries for minimal work.”). 
 237. We take no position about whether judges should set the fees by themselves, or instead, 
appoint attorneys who, in turn, set those fees. Compare Burch, supra note 20, at 128 (recommending 
judges determine lead lawyer fees on a quantum-meruit basis) with Silver & Miller, supra note 61, at 
160–69 (recommending that judges establish a process where lawyers with the largest numbers of 
clients and the strongest interests in getting good, cost-effective representation hire and set fees for 
attorneys performing common benefit work). 
 238. See, e.g., In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 574 F. Supp. 2d 606, 617 (E.D. La. 2008) 
(presumptively capping originating attorneys’ fees at 32% of the settlement value), partially overruled 
by 650 F. Supp. 2d 549, 565 (E.D. La. 2009) (upholding the cap of originating attorney’s fees at 32% 
with the caveat that “in the rare case where an individual attorney believes a departure from this cap is 
warranted, he shall be entitled to submit evidence to the Court for consideration”); In re Guidant Corp. 
Implantable Defibrillators Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 05–1708 (DWF/AJB), 2008 WL 682174, at 
*10 (D. Minn. Mar. 7, 2008) (noting that “Plaintiffs’ counsel achieved a global settlement of 
$240,000,000.00 for 8,550 Plaintiffs” and “that many of the individual cases likely are not strong 
stand-alone cases” and using this to justify the amount of the common benefit award). 
 239. See, e.g., Erichson, supra note 8; Grabill, supra note 8, at 182; Alexandra N. Rothman, Note, 
Bringing an End to the Trend: Cutting Judicial “Approval” and “Rejection” out of Non-Class Mass 
Settlement, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 319, 353 (2011).  
 240. Wolff, supra note 26 (arguing that substantive law empowered Judge Hellerstein to review 
substantive settlements); In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 433 F. Supp. 2d 268, 271 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) 
(grounding a judicial duty to review settlements in part in the court’s fiduciary obligation to plaintiffs 
using medication to treat bipolar schizophrenia). 
 241. Transcript of Status Conference at 54, In re World Trade Center Disaster Site Litig., No. 21 
MC 100 (AKH) (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2010); Alvin K. Hellerstein, Democratization of Mass Tort 
Litigation: Presiding over Mass Tort Litigation to Enhance Participation and Control by the People 
Whose Claims Are Being Asserted, 45 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 473, 476 (2012) (“I declined to 
approve the settlement, rejecting objections that I lacked authority to review settlements agreed to by 
counsel in individual lawsuits. Ultimately, the settlement amounts were increased, the fees were 
lowered, and the procedures were modified. I then gave my approval.”). 
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Our model, however, parts ways from those who argue that “there is no 
need or justification for judicial review of private mass tort settlements 
because such settlements only bind those plaintiffs who affirmatively opt 
in to them.”242 As we show in Part I, while individual settlements in 
“classic” cases may be improved by assurances that the parties knowingly 
and voluntarily entered into their individual agreements, attorneys’ 
system-wide practices often predetermine most “choices” even in 
informally aggregated settlements. In such cases, judges should be able to, 
at least, demand that institutional players properly obtain information and 
explain the trade-offs they make in routine settlements they broker. 
Otherwise, aggregate settlements may elude scrutiny by large 
constituencies who, one way or the other, depend on early negotiations to 
determine the value of their own claims.  
2. Administrative Law 
Judges that review administrative settlements enjoy less formal power 
than judges in multidistrict litigation to organize how the parties interact 
before they file a consent decree. But courts still can demand more public 
input and call attention to recurring problems in government deal-making 
procedures in ways that similarly benefit repeat settlement practice.  
Our view, for example would support judicial efforts to include 
interested stakeholders in a large settlement process. For example, the 
D.C. Circuit’s conclusion in Association of Irritated Residents that judges 
could not review the EPA’s industry-wide settlement without interfering 
with the agency’s “prosecutorial discretion” ignored the important role 
courts play in preventing aggregate settlements from scuttling the interests 
of third parties, while ensuring the open development of law.
243
 In this 
sense, Judge Rogers was right to require that the EPA explain the basis for 
the settlement in a public notice, subject to public comment.
244
  
Judges may also encourage public institutions, like federal agencies 
and prosecutors, to reevaluate their own settlement practices by inviting 
more public scrutiny. After Judge Rakoff demanded that the SEC explain 
why a corporate defendant did not have to “admit or deny” responsibility 
when the same defendant did so in a parallel criminal case,
245
 the SEC 
 
 
 242. Grabill, supra note 8, at 182; see also Erichson, supra note 8, at 1024 (“When a judge 
purports to reject a settlement that would have been acceptable to the parties, the judge deprives the 
parties of control over their claims.”).  
 243. See supra notes 146–150 and accompanying text. 
 244. See supra notes 149–150 and accompanying text. 
 245. S.E.C. v. Vitesse Semiconductor Corp., 771 F. Supp. 2d 304 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
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revisited its policy for handling settlements in parallel criminal and civil 
proceedings.
246
 Similarly, after Judge Pauley chastised the SEC for its 
“embarrassing” handling of a $700 million distribution fund for investors, 
he required that the SEC develop a plan to identify victims of fraud with 
more particular information about the securities covered, securities 
violations alleged, and time periods for investor losses.
247
 Shortly 
thereafter, the SEC revised its policy for providing victim restitution.
248
 
Other commentators similarly point to the benefits of judicial review of 
antitrust settlements, observing that they deter “sweetheart” deals between 
the Federal Trade Commission and big business.
249
  
Viewing judicial review of administrative dealmaking from this angle, 
the Second Circuit may have underestimated some of the benefits of Judge 
Rakoff’s approach for agency regulators. By limiting the judge’s 
consideration of a consent decree to only whether it was “procedurally 
proper,”250 the court ignored the vital way judges may call attention to 
agency drift and encourage more public discussion about their settlement 
policies.
251
 However, the Second Circuit was right in other ways. Judge 
Rakoff could not categorically reject settlements because he disagreed 
with the SEC’s charging decision252 or “discretionary matters of policy,” 
 
 
 246. David S. Hilzenrath, SEC Changes Settlement Rules for Companies Found Guilty of Crimes, 
WASH. POST (Jan. 6, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/sec-settlements-with-
companies-found-guilty-of-crimes-will-acknowledgewrongdoing/2012/01/06/gIQAf9yRfP_story.html. 
 247. S.E.C. v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 626 F. Supp. 2d 402, 403 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“When such cases 
settle and the adversarial process melts away—the engagement and commitment of the parties to bring 
the matter to conclusion weakens. Further, the application of inherently incompatible remedial 
principles—disgorgement, penalties, and restitution—should be analyzed carefully before a Court is 
burdened with tortured restructuring and embarrassing consequences.”). 
 248. The SEC now centralizes the settlement process for restitution claims in the same department 
and carefully demands more information about injured investors during the settlement process. See 
Velikonja, supra note 11, at 389–90 (“It appears that the SEC took the court’s harsh words to heart 
after the Global Research Analyst Settlement and learned from its mistakes.”). 
 249. Lloyd C. Anderson, United States v. Microsoft, Antitrust Consent Decrees, and the Need for 
a Proper Scope of Judicial Review, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 37–38 (1996) (finding that, since judges 
began reviewing the adequacy of antitrust consent decrees in the 1970s, “there appear to have been 
almost no controversies” or “cries of foul play”); Lawrence G. Baxter, “Capture” in Financial 
Regulation: Can We Channel It Toward the Common Good?, 21 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 175, 182 
(2011). 
 250. S.E.C. v. Citigroup Global Mks., Inc., 752 F.3d 285, 295 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 251. Accord Case Comment, Securities Regulation — Consent Decrees — Second Circuit 
Clarifies That a Court’s Review of an SEC Settlement Should Focus on Procedural Propriety. — SEC 
v. Citigroup Global Markets, Inc., 752 F.3d 285 (2d Cir. 2014), 128 HARV. L. REV. 1288, 1288 (2015) 
(“By reformulating the standard of review as a highly deferential procedural test, however, the Second 
Circuit overcorrected….”). 
 252. S.E.C. v. Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328, 330 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (suggesting 
that the defendant should have been charged with an “allegation of knowing and fraudulent intent” 
rather than “negligence”). 
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such as the SEC’s decision to settle without requiring Citigroup to admit 
liability.
253
 The SEC, and not Judge Rakoff, must evaluate the best way to 
allocate its own resources to deter wrongdoing, subject to difficult 
budgetary constraints. But by limiting the questions federal judges may 
ask when they review consent decrees, the Second Circuit inadvertently 
deprived the SEC and other agencies of an important tool to evaluate when 
their own settlement practice runs off the rails.
254
  
3. Criminal Law 
Although courts in criminal law enjoy more formal authority to review 
deals struck between the government and criminal defendants, our model 
also has consequences for how courts have interpreted their “supervisory” 
authority to review and set aside deferred prosecution and plea 
agreements.  
Our prodding model of judicial review would allow judges limited 
authority over DPAs to ensure that prosecutors adequately represent the 
public interest and that the aggregated settlement process produces 
legitimate and accurate outcomes. Accordingly, it would support orders 
designed to introduce more information and explanation in the settlement 
process, like Judge Gleeson’s request that the parties explain why the 
agreement “adequately reflect[ed] the seriousness of the offense behavior 
and why accepting the DPA would yield a result consistent with the goals 
of our federal sentencing scheme.”255  
However, our approach does not necessarily embrace Judge Young’s 
position in Orthofix. Importantly, the judge’s decision expressly worried 
about the aggregate impact of the prosecutors’ settlement practice—“such 
a bargain, however agreeable to the executive—once aggregated together 
with similar decisions across the criminal justice system—results in the 
denigration of the criminal law.”256 Moreover, Judge Young’s rejection of 
the pleas was concerned not only with “robbing corrective justice in this 
particular case” but also that the systematic settlement of similar corporate 
cases with similarly lenient plea agreements was undermining “the 
 
 
 253. Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., 752 F.3d at 297. 
 254. Although the Second Circuit rejected Judge Rakoff’s efforts to get more of the “cold, hard, 
solid facts” to support the settlement, id. at 295, the Second Circuit may also have underestimated the 
SEC’s capacity to factually support its settlement decisions.  
 255. United States v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., No. 12–CR–763, 2013 WL 3306161, at *1 
(E.D.N.Y. July 1, 2013). 
 256. United States v. Orthofix, Inc., 956 F. Supp. 2d 316, 334 (D. Mass. 2013). 
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normative edifice of the criminal law.”257 Judge Young’s solution, 
however, did not force the government to reevaluate its position, but 
instead simply forced the government to change its plea bargaining 
practice in a way that maximized judicial power over the final sentence.  
Finally, even as it understates the role of aggregation in criminal law, 
the Supreme Court’s approach in Padilla, Frye, and Lafler also 
demonstrates the potential of a judicial model designed to prod aggregate 
settlement practice. Padilla, notably, invited prosecutors, public defenders, 
and rules committees to improve their approach to plea offers to 
noncitizens, which often involve high volumes of plea bargains to resolve 
many different low-level infractions.
258
 Simply reaffirming judges’ 
obligation to review whether defendants received adequate counsel in plea 
negotiations like those in Padilla caused some prosecutor’s offices—
already in a superior position to prevent and counteract errors—to adopt 
policies that give all defendants written warnings and list the types of 
convictions that could trigger immigration consequences.
259
 Public 
defenders also began cultivating in-house immigration experts among their 
attorneys and staff, as well as changing arraignment procedures and 
providing guides and checklists for defense lawyers to follow in preparing 
cases.
260
 Similarly, after Frye, federal defender offices lobbied federal 
prosecutors to change boilerplate terms in plea agreements in ways they 
could not do on a case-by-case basis.
261
 As one commentator observes, the 
 
 
 257. Id. at 336–37. 
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 259. CRIMINAL COURTS & CRIMINAL JUSTICE OPERATIONS COMMS., N.Y.C. BAR ASS’N, PADILLA 
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http://www2.nycbar.org/pdf/report/uploads/PadillaCrimCtsCJOReportFINAL6.15.11.pdf; IMMIGRANT 
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THE IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS 13–14 (2011), http://immigrant 
defenseproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/postpadilla FINALNov 2011.pdf. 
 260. The American Bar Association also developed guidance for prosecutors and defense lawyers 
on their obligations post-Padilla. See Mark Walsh, Task Force Probes Defense Lawyers’ Role After 
Padilla, A.B.A. J. (Apr. 1, 2011), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/task_force_probes_ 
defense_lawyers_role_after_padilla/.; AM. BAR ASS’N CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, PADILLA AND 
BEYOND 23–54 (2010) (reprinting practice advisories, checklists, and interview sheet by The Bronx 
Defenders, Immigrant Legal Resource Center, Immigrant Defense Project, Public Defender Service for 
the District of Columbia, and American Bar Association Criminal Justice Section). 
 261. See Klein et al., supra note 98, at 87 (empirically reviewing boilerplate plea agreements and 
finding that “[f]orty-nine districts’ boilerplate agreements that mandate waivers of collateral attack 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
606 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 94:545 
 
 
 
 
Supreme Court’s decision “woke up a wide range of actors,” and “prodded 
them all to address a problem that they had largely ignored until then.” 262 
  
CONCLUSION 
Debates will continue about whether judges enjoy power to certify 
quasi-class actions, disturb blockbuster settlement arrangements with big 
banks, or question how prosecutors treat broad classes of defendants under 
the rules that govern civil, administrative, and criminal cases.
263
 But 
commentators have devoted less attention to what aggregated settlement 
means for our public system of adjudication and specifically for the 
obligations of the judges who shepherd cases through that system.  
Generalist judges have historically encouraged public administrative 
systems to act deliberatively and responsively on behalf of the people who 
create and depend on them.
264
 We believe that judges should perform a 
similar role—generating more information, participation, and reasoned 
reflection—in the private bureaucracies that dominate the way our justice 
system now resolves disputes. 
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